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THE PROCEDURE BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
PETER E. HERZOG*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Court of Justice of the European Communities has inspired
much legal writing, including many books and articles in English.'
Particular attention has been paid to its jurisdiction2 and general
organization,' much less to its procedure. But Professor Sereni has
pointed out that differences in the domestic procedural laws of states
appearing before an international court may cause difficulties in the
work of the international tribunal itself.' It therefore may be of
interest to review briefly some aspects of the procedure of a court
which is perhaps not an international tribunal in the strict sense of
the word,5 but in which sovereign states, supranational organizations
*Associate Professor of Law and Law Librarian, Syracuse University College of
Law. The author wishes to express his gratitude to the International Law and
Organizations Project of Syracuse University, directed by Dr. Gerard J. Mangone,
Acting Dean of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, for its
support, which made the author's research in Brussels and Luxemburg possible.
During his stay in these two cities, the author received valuable aid from a
number of persons, including Judge Monaco, attaches Daig and Gori, Registrar
Van Houtte, Deputy Registrar Everson and Librarian Sperl of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities, Director Baeyens and Legal Counsellors
Bebr and Leleu of the Joint Legal Service of the European Communities and Me.
Sluzny of Brussels and Me. Arendt of Luxemburg, two attorneys appearing frequently
before the Court of Justice of the European Communities. They provide informa-
tion and supplied copies of statistics, procedural documents and other papers not
available in any other way. Finally, the author wishes to thank Miss Judith A.
Smith of the Syracuse University College of Law Library for bibliographic
assistance. However, the author claims sole responsibility for all mistakes, errors
and omissions appearing in this paper.
1For bibliographical references concerning the European Communities in general
and the Court of Justice of the European Communities in particular, see, e.g.,
Selected Literature on the European Common Market, 14 THE REcoRD 400 (1959)
and 17 THE RECORD 263 (1962); 2 CCH Cosi. MET. L. REP. P 9901 (1965).
For a critical evaluation see Wheeler, A Critique of Handbooks on Common Market
Law, 56 LAw LIB. J. 120 (1963).
2 The Court's jurisdiction is studied in detail in BEBR, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1962). See also VALENTINE, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNTIES (2 vols. 1965); cf. Mashaw, Federal Issues in and
About the Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Communities,
40 TULANE L. Rxv. 21 (1965).3 See, e.g., FELD, THE CoURT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 14-33 (1964) ; Feld,
The Judges of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 9 VIuL. L. REv. 37
(1963).
' See SERENI, PRINcIPI GENERALI Di DIRITro E PROCESSO INTER=NAZIONALE (1955).
'There has been much discussion whether the Court of Justice of the European
Communities is basically an international tribunal analogous to the International
Court of Justice, a kind of federal supreme court of a newly emerging federation,
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and private individuals appear and plead far more frequently than in
the International Court of Justice. The brief discussion of the Court's
organization and jurisdiction which will preface the discussion of pro-
cedure in the narrow sense is intended mainly as background.
II. THE COURT-ORGANIZATION AND HISTORY
A. History of the Court
The Court of Justice of the European Communities is the successor
of the Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community
created by the Treaty of Paris of 1951. The basic rules concerning that
court's jurisdiction were laid down in the treaty. An annexed protocol
contained the statute of the court with additional provisions relating
to its organization and procedure.' These were not very detailed.
Instead, the court was authorized and directed to promulgate rules
of procedure.7 The new court opened officially on December 4, 1952,
in Luxemburg with the swearing in of its seven judges. Its first busi-
ness was the drafting of rules of procedure, which were promulgated
on March 4, 1953.1 The court was then ready to begin its judicial
functions. About a year later, the court published additional rules
concerning the rights and duties of attorneys and agents appearing
or a supranational organ sui generis. These attempts at classification seem to
have little practical importance. Indeed, Judge Hammes, presently the President
of the Court, once spoke of a "mania!' in that regard. Hammes, La Cour de Justice
des Communauts Europ~ennes, mimeographed text of lecture delivered in Luxem-
burg, 1959, p. 4. See generally DEL Aux, LA CoUR DE JUSTICE DE LA COMMUNAUTAZ
EUROPLENNE DU CHo"no Er DE L'AciER 11 (1956); MIGLIAzzA, LA CORTE Di
GrusTIziA DELLE COMMUNirT, EtmOPEE 1-39 (1961); RiC EoMT, COMMUNAUT9
EUROPIENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'AciER, LA COUR DE JUsTIcE 367 (1954) ; Donner,
De aard van de Rechtspraak van het Hof vat Juslitie der Europese Gerneenschappen,
[19601 SocIAI.-EcoxomiscHE WETGmVnIG 73.
' Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951,
261 U.N.T.S. 140.
'Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Coal and
Steel Community annexed to treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community, supra note 6, art. 44.
'See Riese, Die Verfahrensordnuug des Gerichtshofes des Europaeischen
Geincinschaft fuer Kohle ulnd Stahl, 6 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHnFT 521
(1953) (hereinafter abbreviated N.J.W.) for a discussion of the role played by
various members of the Court and of the models (such -as the Rules of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice and national civil and administrative procedures) which
were followed. The original rules of the Court were published in the Journal
Officiel de la Communaut6 Europ~enne du Charbon et de L'Acier, March 7, 1953,
pp. 37-55. Hereinafter this publication, and for the years 1958 and following
(Journal Officiel des Communaut~s Europ~ennes), shall be abbreviated J. 0. The
German edition of the Official Gazette of the European Communities shall be
cited as Amtsblatt. The treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and
Steel Community, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (1951), will hereinafter be referred to as the
Coal and Steel Treaty and the annexed statute of the Court as the Coal and Steel
Statute.
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before the court, recusant witnesses and letters rogatory.9 The original
rules had ignored costs, and this matter was taken care of in a further
set of rules promulgated shortly thereafter. 0
In 1957, the nations which had participated in the European Coal
and Steel Community signed the two treaties creating the European
Economic Community ("Common Market") and the European Atomic
Energy Community ("Euratom"). Each treaty provided for the crea-
tion of a court of justice to serve as judicial arm of its community."
Annexed to each treaty was a protocol containing the statute of the
court. A further convention on certain institutions common to the
European Communities provided that a single court should perform
the functions of the separate courts mentioned in the various treaties.12
It did not give that court a distinctive name, however. In accordance
with the convention, the Court of Justice of the European Coal and
Steel Community came to an end in 1958 and was replaced by, or
rather continued as, the Court of Justice for the three communities.
There was some change in judicial personnel. Pending cases were
continued.
One of the first activities of the new Court following the appointment
of its members seems to have been the selection of a name. It chose
the name "Court of Justice of the European Communities," though no
official announcement to that effect was ever published in the Official
Gazette of the European Communities.'" The Court then prepared a
9 These rules were adopted by the Court on March 31, 1954, and published in
J. 0., April 7, 1954, p. 302. They were published separately because they had to
be approved by the Council of Ministers of the Coal and Steel Community, while
no such approval was necessary for the ordinary rules. Coal and Steel Statute, art. 44.
10 The rules as to costs were adopted on May 19, 1954 and published in J. 0.,
May 26, 1954, p. 373. Cf. Roemer, Die Kostenordnung des Gerichtshofes fuer
Kohle und Stahl, 8 N.J.W. 617 (1955).
' Convention establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11, art. 4; Convention establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167, art. 3. The treaty establishing
the European Economic Community, ratified by the member states of Belgium,
Germany, France, Italy, Luxemburg and The Netherlands in 1957 and effective
January 1, 1958, shall hereinafter be cited as Treaty, and the annexed statute of the
Court as Statute. The Convention establishing the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity shall hereinafter be cited as the Euratom Treaty and the annexed Statute as the
Euratom Statute. It might be noted at this point that the treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Defense Community had also made the Court of Justice of the European Coal and
Steel Community the judicial arm of the Defense Community, but that treaty never
achieved ratification. RiCHEmONT, op. cit. supra note 5, at 3.
'Convention relating to certain institutions common to the European Com-
munities, annexed to Treaty, arts. 3, 4.
" The name Court of Justice of the European Communities seems to have been
adopted at a session of the Court (in chambers) on October 8, 1958. The J. 0. of
October 19, 1958, p. 453, published an announcement that the "Court of Justice of
the European Communities" had entered upon its official duties on October 7,
1958, when its members took their oath and that the old rules were to be continued
[VOL. 41 : 383
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new set of rules, which were promulgated on March 3, 1959.Y The
rules of the old Coal and Steel court were abrogated. The new rules
had to be submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval;" the
Rome treaties of 1957 did not continue the Court's power to make
rules without outside supervision."0 The rules did not deal with three
matters for which, in the nature of things, the cooperation of the
member states of the communities was particularily necessary, namely
letters rogatory, legal aid and the punishment of perjurious witnesses
and experts. After consultation with the governments of the member
states and council approval, supplemental rules concerning these
matters were enacted on March 9, 1962.Y1 Hence, the legal provisions
relating to the procedure of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities must be gleaned from a rather multifarious array of
texts: the Coal and Steel, Common Market and Euratom treaties,
the statutes annexed to them, the protocol on common institutions
of the three communities, and the Court's rules of 1959 as well as the
supplemental rules of 1962. Furthermore, additional conventions as
well as rules and regulations enacted by various community organs
affect the Court. The Brussels agreement of April 8, 1965, which
provides for the merging of the Executives of the European Com-
munities-though not of the Communities themselves-but has not
yet gone into effect, does not simplify that situation very much. If
affects Court procedure only incidentally."8
pending the enactment of new ones. The announcement made no direct reference
to the adoption of the name "Court of Justice of the European Communities,"
which seems to have been suggested by Dr. Daig, one of the attaches of the Court.
See Daig, Die Gerichtsbarkeit in der Europaeischen Wirtschaftsgemeischtft und
Europaeischen Atomngemeinschaft, 83 ARcrlv FuER OEFFENTLICHEs RECHT 132, 135
(1958).
"J. 0., March 21, 1959, p. 349; cf. J. 0., Jan. 18, 1960, p. 17. Hereinafter these
rules will be cited as Rules of Procedure. The new rules do not affect rights either
acquired or lost under the old rules. Elz. v. Haute Autorit6 de ]a C.E.C.A., case
34-59, 6 Recueil de la Jurisprudence de la Cour 215 (1960) (Hereinafter cited
Recueil).
"Treaty, art. 188 and Euratom Treaty, art. 160 provide in identical language
that the Court of Justice promulgates its rules of procedure which are subject
to unanimous approval by the Council of Ministers.V See note 9 supra.
"TJ. 0., May, 1962, p. 113. Cf. Rasquin, Le R~glenrent additionnel de procedure
de la Cor de Justice des Communautis Europenites, 77 JoURNAL DEs TEIhUNAUX
345 (1962).
' See generally Houben, The Merger of the Executives of the Europeanr Comn-
munities, 3 CoM. MxT. L. REv. 37 (1965) (with text of merger treaty). Unless
otherwise noted, this discussion will deal with the procedure of the Court as
presently in force. The various statutory provisions, rules and regulations affecting
the organization, jurisdiction and procedure of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities have been collected in 1963 in a volume called Rzcuu.m DE TEXTEs
(TFXTSAMMUNG) available in all four Community languages and edited by Mr.
Everson, Deputy Registrar and Mr. Sperl, Librarian of the court.
19661
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B. Court Organization
The Court of Justice of the European Communities consists of seven
judges appointed for terms of six years by unanimous agreement of the
member states. 9 In practice, each member nation has the right to
propose one judge (one nation can propose two judges), and the
proposals made by a member state concerning the appointment of
"its" judge are not seriously challenged by the other nations. 20 The
membership of the Court is subject to partial renewal every three
years. The members of the Court elect one of their colleagues as
presiding judge for a period of three years. All judges of the Court
must now be law-trained and qualified to hold highest judicial office
in their home state, or be otherwise possessed of outstanding qualifica-
tions.2 The rules for the appointment of judges have been criticized
on the ground that the short, but renewable terms give the member
states too much power over "their" judges. In fact, however, no
complaints about improper conduct by judges seem to have been
voiced.12  Furthermore, rather substantial salaries (at least by Euro-
pean standards) and sizable severance benefits payable to a judge
not reappointed at the end of his term may tend to increase judicial
"Coal and Steel Treaty, art. 32; Euratom Treaty, art 137; Treaty, art. 165.
The Council of Ministers may, by unanimous vote, increase the number of judges
if the Court so requests. So far, no such request has been made. See generally
Adler, The EEC Court of Justice, 7 CANADuN BAR J. 102 (1964).
'The treaties do not require judges to be nationals of member nations and
the appointment of one "outsider" seems to have been considered possibly desirable
at one time. In practice, however, the judges have always been nationals of the
member states, and the same is true of the other court officials. As of this writing,
Italy is the only member state represented by two nationals on the bench of the
court; however, one of the two advocates-general is German and the other French,
while the Registrar is Belgian and the Deputy Registrar, Dutch. A substantial
change in this system seems unlikely. See, e.g., Eichler, Zur Stellung des Richtcrs
in ueberstaatliche Gemeinschaften, 6 N.J.W. 1034, 1044 (1953) ; Tizzano, La Corte
di Giustizia, 3 QuADRi, MoNAco, TRABUCcHI, COMIMENTAMO c= 1200-01 (1965).
1 Coal and Steel Treaty, art. 32b; Euratom Treaty, art. 129; Treaty, art. 167.
It is not entirely clear what "qualifications for the highest judicial office!' implies.
In many European countries there are several coordinate supreme courts dealing
with different subject matters, and qualifications for appointment to these courts
are not necessarily uniform. The rules concerning the qualifications of judges seem
to be mainly hortatory. Cf. BAECHLE, DIE RECHTSSTELLUNG DES RicHTeMS Alt
GmsCHTSnoF Da EuRoPAiscHEN GEm SCHA.1 rEN 30, 31 (1961).
1In addition, some people would have preferred that members of the Court
be chosen only among career judges (in the European sense), because these would
have a more judicial temperament than the present judges, many of whom have
previously been government officials, law teachers, etc. Additionally, career judges
were thought to be more independent, less inclined to favor any special interest
group. Cf. BAECHLE, op. cit. supra note 21, at 33-35; Riese, Erfahrungcn aus der
Praxis des Gerichtshofes der Europaeischen Gemeinschaft fuer Kohle und Stahl,
[1958] DEUTScnE RICHTERzEITTjxG 270, 271. Even the rule providing for partial
renewal of the Court every three years has been questioned. See Daig, supra note
13 at 148 n.46.
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self-reliance.23 The rule prohibiting the disclosure of opinions voiced
by judges in conference and the absence of dissenting opinions makes
it difficult for outsiders to blame any particular member of the Court
for a decision reached by the Court and is an additional guarantee of
judicial independence. 24
Also on the staff of the Court are two so-called advocates-general
(avocats g~ndraux, Generalanwaelte). Their role is similar to that of
the commissaires du gouvernement before the highest French adminis-
trative tribunal, the Conseil d'Etat: one of them prepares an elaborate
submission (conclusions, Schlussantraege) for each case; in it he sur-
veys the facts of the case and the applicable law and suggests a
judgment to the Court. The advocate-general represents only the law
as such and his own conscience.2 1 He is by no means the representative
of the interests of the European Communities.26 The Court is not
bound to decide in accordance with the advocate-general's submission,
but frequently does so.
Each judge and advocate-general is assisted by one attachi, who
performs functions quite similar to those performed by the law clerk of
an American judge. However, the attaches enjoy permanent appoint-
ments.
27
The Registrar of the Court is in charge of the Court records and
must be present at each hearing. In addition, he is the chief ad-
'A regulation of the Council of Ministers of the Coal and Steel Community,
Common Market and Euratom published in Amtsblatt, July 19, 1962, p. 1713,
provides for the following monthly salaries: President of Court, 85,000 B. F.;
judges and advocates-general, 68,750 B. F.; Registrar, 61,600 B. F. To these base
amounts must be added a 5% family allowance for heads of family and a 15%
residence allowance. Furthermore an allowance of 1000 B. F. per child entitled
to support may be paid. (100 B. F. equal about $2.) There is an additional
allowance for entertainment expenses. For a period of three years after the expira-
tion of their appointment at the Court, former members of the Court may receive
a kind of readjustment allowance varying between 40% and 50% of their base
salary. Upon reaching age 65, members of the Court are entitled to a pension
varying with their length of service; it may reach 50% of their salary. These
salaries and benefits, while not unusually large when compared with American
judicial salaries, are very substantial by European standards. The independence
of the members of the Court is further strengthened by rather far-reaching im-
munities. Coal and Steel Statute, art. 3; Statute, art. 3; Euratom Statute, art 3.
Cf. BAECILE, op. cit. supra note 21, at 111-22.
.' Cf. BAECHLE, op. cit. supra note 21, at 83-86; 1 CoLIx, LE GouVERNEMENT
DES JUGEs DANS LEs CommUNAUT S EUROPtENNES 54 (Th~se Nancy 1963).
'Coal and Steel Treaty, art. 32a; Euratom Treaty, art. 138; Treaty, art. 166.
The qualifications for the advocates-general are the same as for the judges. Their
term of office is six years, but the terms are staggered so that one advocate-general
is to be replaced or reappointed every three years. As to their salaries and
fringe benefits, see note 23 supra.
" Cf. Daig, supra note 13, at 148 n.45.
'
7The attaches are considered as regular employees of the court. Each judge has
an attach6 of his own nationality. They are usually expert linguists and hence
even more valuable to the judges of the Court than law clerks are in the United
1966]
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ministrative officer of the Court: 28 unlike national courts in Europe,
which are administratively part of an executive department, the
Ministry of Justice, the Court of Justice of the European Communities
administers itself. Since the Court must conduct its proceedings in all
the four official languages of the Communities, Dutch, French, German,
and Italian, it has a language department which translates all docu-
ments received or issued by the Court and operates the simultaneous
translation service which makes it possible to follow oral proceedings
of the Court in any of the Community languages." Since legal mater-
ials cannot be translated properly except by persons well versed in
comparative law who are also language experts, the staff of the lan-
guage department is quite highly qualified. The use of such highly
qualified people for a relatively unglamorous activity seems to create
occasional problems in human relations. The members of the Court
have a large library and documentation service at their disposal. Al-
together, about one hundred persons are employed by the Court,
counting also messengers, Court attendants, et cetera.3 The Court
publishes its own law reports3' and various other materials.3  All of
States. Cf. FELD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 26; Riese, supra note 22, at 271.
Coal and Steel Statute, art. 16; Statute, art. 12; and Euratom Statute, art. 12
authorizes the Council of Ministers, at the request of the Court, to appoint
assistant reporters who, apparently, were intended to fulfill functions somewhat
similar to those of the attach6s, but on a more formalized basis. So far, the
Court has not requested their appointment. It might be noted here that each judge
and advocate-general is assigned one personal secretary, in addition to his attache,
and also a driver. National courts in Europe do not usually make such elaborate
provisions for their members.
' Coal and Steel Treaty, art. 32c; Treaty, art. 168; Euratom Treaty, art. 140;
Rules of Procedure arts. 11, 20, 22. As chief administrative officer, the Registrar
is also in charge of the Court's entire staff (excepting, of course, the judges and
advocates-general). Coal and Steel Statute, art. 16; Statute, art. 11; Euratom
Statute, art. 11. On June 23, 1960, the Court issued a set of "Instructions to the
Registrar" detailing his duties, Amtsblatt, Nov. 18, 1960, p. 1417, which were
modified April 6, 1962. Amtsblatt, May 5, 1962, p. 1115 (hereinafter cited as
Instructions to Registrar).
' Rules of Procedure, art. 21. The translation service consists now of about
12 translators and a substantial secretarial staff.
' The total budgeted expenses of the Court for 1963 were $1,265,440, most of
it (except for about $80,000) being allocated for salaries, fringe benefits, travel
expenses and related items. The expenses are shared by the three European Com-
munities.
" From volume six on, the Court's law reports have been issued in pamphlet
form several times a year, each pamphlet including a number of cases. The pamphlets
are paginated continuously, so that they can be bound at the end of the year, at
which time a title page and general index are supplied to subscribers. During
the early part of 1965, this system was modified and each decision was printed in
a separately paginated pamphlet. This turned out to be impractical and a return
to the prior practice was soon effectuated. The reports contain the judgments of the
Court as well as the submissions of the advocates-general. In this paper, the French
edition (Recueil de la Jurisprudence de la Cour) has been used.
'2These include a Bibliography on European Integration and the Collection
of texts mentioned at note 18 supra.
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these are available in all four community languages.
The Court is divided into two panels of three judges,2 3 one of whom
is the presiding judge of the panel. Each advocate-general is assigned
to one of the panels.34 Cases brought by member states or Community
institutions, as well as cases transferred from a national court for a
preliminary ruling, must be heard by the full Court, rather than a
panel. Under the treaties other matters may be assigned to a panel;"5
in fact only proceedings brought by employees of one of the Com-
munity institutions against their employer are heard by a panel; all
other cases are heard by the full Court.3 6
When a case is heard by the full Court, five judges constitute a
quorum but an uneven number of judges must sit; in fact, all seven
judges are usually present."
C. Case Load of Court
The number of cases handled by the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities is not large, compared with the case load of some
courts in the member states-though these usually have far larger
staffs. However, it is much more substantial than that of other inter-
national tribunals, as appendix I indicates.3
At present about a year seems to elapse between the time the first
pleading is filed and the final decision of a case. A small backlog of
cases has built up mainly as a result of many suits filed by Community
employees around 1963 when the introduction of new personnel rules
' The treaties authorize panels of three of five judges; in fact, two panels of
three judges have been constituted. Treaty, art. 165, Statute, art. 15; Euratom
Treaty, art. 137, Statute, art. 15; Coal and Steel Treaty, art. 32, Statute, art. 18;
Rules of Procedure, art. 24. The panel presidents are elected for one year terms by
the Court. Rules of Procedure, art. 6.
" Rules of Procedure, art. 10.
'Treaty, art. 165; Euratom Treaty, art. 137; Coal and Steel Treaty, art. 32.
"Rules of Procedure, art. 95. Suits by employees of the Councils of Ministers,
European Parliament and Common Market Commission are assigned to the second
panel, those of the other institutions to the first panel. Decision of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities of Oct. 9, 1963, J. 0., Oct. 29, 1963, p. 2598.
The panels also may deal with certain matters arising incidentally during the
course of a suit (proof, costs). These will be discussed below. The panels may
transfer suits handled by them to the full Court. Rules of Procedure, art. 95 § 2.
This is done if a question of principle is involved. See, e.g., Raponi v. Commission
de la C.E.E., case 27-63, 10 Recueil 289 (1963).
' If one of the judges is absent when the full Court sits, the junior judge present
must withdraw so as to have an uneven number of judges. The panels must always
sit with three judges; if one of the regular panel members is unavailable, a
judge from the other panel must join the panel on a temporary basis. Statute, art.
15; Euratom Statute, art. 15; Coal and Steel Statute, art. 18; Rules of Procedure,
art. 26.
' Table taken from a volume of unpublished statistics kindly made available
to this writer by Mr. Everson, Deputy Registrar of the Court.
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caused some dissatisfaction among employees not granted permanent
tenure. This backlog undoubtedly will disappear within the near
future.
D. Language Rules
It would perhaps have been possible to authorize everybody appear-
ing before the Court of Justice of the European Communities to use
any of the four official languages of the Communities, Dutch
(Flemish), French, German, and Italian. However, to facilitate the
work of the Court's translation service, all parties to a suit must use
one single language, referred to as the procedural language.30 All
papers filed by parties (pleadings, memoranda) must be in that lan-
guage which must also be used for oral argument. Original documents
not in the procedural language must be accompanied by translation,
though a partial translation is sufficient in the case of very bulky
documents, unless the Court otherwise orders.40 Similarly, judgments
and orders of the court are issued in the procedural language, and all
entries in the Court records are made in that language.4' Judgments
and Court orders are later always translated into all four official
community languages, but only the text in the procedural language is
binding.4"
Judges and advocates-general in addressing parties during a hearing,
and the reporting judge for his report are not bound to use the
procedural language. "
The rules governing the choice of the procedural language seem
based on the idea that the Community institutions know all four
official languages, while private individuals are not necessarily in the
same position.44 Hence, the choice of the procedural language is
ordinarily left to the plaintiff who is much more frequently a private
individual or firm than a Community institution. The plaintiff is, of
course, limited to one of the Community languages. When the de-
fendant is a member state or a national of a member state, the official
language of that state is the procedural language unless the parties
have agreed otherwise, or the Court has authorized the use of a different
Riese, supra note 8, at 23.
"Rules of Procedure, art. 29. Witnesses and experts are obviously not bound
to testify in the procedural language, or even one of the four official languages.
The Registrar's office must provide translations in such a case.
,' Instructions to Registrar, arts. 7, 15.
"Rules of Procedure, art. 31.
Rules of Procedure, art. 29.
"Riese, Das Sprachenproblent in der Praxis des Gerichtshofes der Europaeischen
Geneihschafte), 2 Vows DEUTSCHEN Zumt EUROPASCHEN REcaT, FESTSCHUrFT FUER
HAirs DOELLE 507, 508 (1963).
[VOL. 41: 33
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language. In cases transferred to the Court from a national court for
a preliminary ruling, the procedure before the Court of Justice of
the European Communities is conducted in the language of the national
court." Plaintiffs of varying nationalities bringing a joint action must
agree on the procedural language. If the Court orders a joinder of
cases already pending for which several procedural languages are used,
the parties may apparently continue to use the languages used by
them before the joinder unless the Court orders something different.
A party seeking to intervene may chose a procedural language for
the proceeding in which permission to intervene is sought, but after
permission to intervene has been granted, it must use the procedural
language adopted for the main case.4
The Court's instructions to the Registrar state that papers not in
the procedural language must be rejected.4 7 Nevertheless, the lan-
guage rules seem to be handled with some liberality. Thus, counsel for
the German government, which had intervened in a suit in which
Dutch was the procedural language, was allowed to argue in German,
though he was requried to submit his writings in Dutch .4  The Court
seems reluctant to invalidate prior proceedings on the ground that
the language rules were not followed, though, on timely request, it
is apparently ready to direct a party submitting documents not trans-
lated into a procedural language to do so, and to stay the proceedings
in the meantime .4
The Court has justified its liberal attitude towards the language
rules by saying that it is conclusively presumed to know all four
Community languages.r ° In practice, not all the judges and advocates-
'If the defendant is a nation having two official languages (in practice, this
applies only to Belgium), or a national of such a nation, the plaintiff may chose
one of these languages. Rules of Procedure, art. 29. It should be noted in this
connection that in Belgium the terms Flemish and Dutch are considered as inter-
changeable. Cf. VAN REurExE EN r ORIANNE, LA PRoCADRE DEVANT LA COUR
45 JUSTICE DES COMMUNAUTtS EUROPtENNES 85, 86 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
VAN RFEPiNGHEN ET ORIANNE].
" Riese, supra note 44, at 508-09. Cf. De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in
Limburg v. Haute Autorit6 de ]a C.E.C.A., case 30-59, 7 Recueil 1 (1961).
"I Instructions to Registrar, art. 4, § 2.
'De Gezarnenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v. Haute Autorit6 de la
C.E.C.A., case 30-59, 7 Recueil 1 (1961).
" Acciaieria Ferriera di Roma v. Haute Autorit6 de la C.E.C.A., case 1-60,
6 Recueil 351 (1960) (Revision procedure may not be used to invalidate a judgment
on the ground that documents submitted by defendant were not translated into
procedural language, when plaintiff's counsel made a passing reference to that
point in his oral argument but did not request a stay).
' Acciaieria Ferriera di Roma v. Haute Autorit6 de la C.E.C.A., supra note
49. The Court also said in that decision that the rules concerning languages did
not involve strong public policy (ordre public). Cf. Barge v. Haute Autorit6 de la
C.E.C.A., case 14-64, 11 Recueil 1 (1965).
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general speak all Community languages. However, all seem to speak
French fairly well. Hence, French has become the unofficial working
language of the Court. The judges' conferences, to which translators
are not admitted, are always conducted in French, and draft opinions
are first circulated in French before they are put into the procedural
language. To make their thoughts clearer, however, some judges will
sometimes state their position first in their own language before re-
stating it in French. Thus language differences seem to have created
no major problems. Unavoidably, there is some loss of meaning, or
at least flavor, if rapid argument by counsel is subjected to a process
of simultaneous translation, and the same is true in the case of the
translation of written documents, since legal terms in the four lan-
guages do not always correspond exactly. Some plaintiffs seek to
alleviate the resulting difficulties by choosing French as the procedural
language, though this is not their national tongue."
E. Professional Legal Assistance
Except when requesting legal aid,"2 parties appearing before the
Court of Justice of the European Communities must do so by counsel.
Member states and Community institutions act through an "agent"
appointed by them for each case. An agent may perform all the
services performed by an attorney in the case of a private party.
He may, but need not be assisted by an attorney. 3 No rules restrict
member states and Community institutions in the choice of the per-
sons they appoint as agents. Now, Community institutions always
select a person on the staff of their joint legal service who is ordinarily
of the same nationality as the plaintiff."
Private individuals and firms must use the service of an attorney
5 1BAEcHLE, op. cit. supra note 21, at 50-53 (noting that the influence of ajudge will necessarily depend on his language ability; Riese, supra note 44, at
510-14. Rules of Procedure, art. 27 § 4 authorizes every member of the Court to
request that every question to be voted on be first written down in the (official)
language chosen by him. This prerogative never seems to have been used.
" Rules of Procedure, art. 76, § 2.
' Statute, and Euratom Statute, art. 17; Coal and Steel Statute, art. 20. Cf. Coal
and Steel Statute, art. 28, Statute, and Euratom Statute, art. 29 and Rules of
Procedure, art. 85: only agents or attorneys may argue during oral procedure.
"While there is a joint legal service for the three Communities, some special-
ization persists; the members of the staff that will appear in Coal and Steel
Community matters have their offices in Luxemburg, while those acting in Common
Market and Euratom matters have their offices in Brussels. Attorneys assist agents
rather infrequently. See generally Gerbrandy, De Regeling van de procedure big het
Hof van Justitie van de Europese Gemeenschappen, 1 SociA-.-EcoNomnscnn WEr-
GEVING EUROPA 87, 91 (1960); Salomonson, Europese kanttekening bif de Bene-
luxontwerpen, 40 ADVOCATENBLAD 7, 12-13 (1960).
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admitted to practice in one of the member states' 5 The attorney need
not be of the same nationality as the party for which he acts. Indeed,
a few attorneys in France, Belgium and Luxemburg seem to have
made a specialty of practicing before the Court of Justice of the
European Communities, attracting clients residing in other states
also.16 Some problems may arise in connection with practitioners from
countries having a legal profession split into several branches, such
as France. Only French avocats, who argue in all the regular courts,
and avocats au Conseil d'Etat et a la Cour de Cassation, who argue in
these two high French tribunals seem to be "attorneys" within the
meaning of the statutes of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities, not, however, avouis who handle the written phases
of court procedure. French avocats appearing before the Court of
Justice of the European Communities handle all phases of the proce-
dure before that Court, in spite of their restriction to oral argument
in France.17 Law teachers may represent parties if they are authorized
to practice in the courts of their home state.s8
Agents and attorneys enjoy a number of immunities. They are
exempt from prosecution for anything they have said or done in
relation to a pending case or the parties. Their documents and papers
are not subject to search or seizure; they must be allowed to travel
if necessary for the performance of their duties, and if their country
controls foreign exchange, they must be allocated foreign currency
needed for necessary travel.59 The Court may lift any of these im-
munities or privileges if that will not interfere with the performance
of the attorney's duties."0 It must be assumed that the rules relating
to these privileges and immunities are binding upon the home state
See authorities cited at note 53 supra. Attorneys must file a certificate from
their proper professional authorities showing that they are members of the bar
in good standing. That certificate is annexed to the first pleading submitted
by the party employing them. Rules of Procedure, art. 38 § 3.
'This is less true of German attorneys because the bar in Germany is more
localized.
" In France, the preparation of pleadings is in the hands of the avouis, who
are said to "represent" their clients, while the avocats merely "assist" them.
Hence it has been argued that French avocats should not sign pleadings filed
with the Court of Justice of the European Communities. RIcHEMONT, op. Cit.
supra note 5, at 146, 169. However, Rules of Procedure, art. 37 prescribes expressly
that all pleadings must be signed by the agent or attorney. It would seem to
override pertinent national laws and customs.
'See authorities cited at note 53 supra. The rule seems to apply only to
countries such as Germany, where law teachers may appear in court generally,
not for instance to France where law teachers are occasionally used by the
government as agents before the International Court of Justice. Salomonson, supra
note 54, at 7. But see RicHEMONT, op. cit. supra note 5, at 144.0 Rules of Procedure, art. 32.
' Rules of Procedure, art. 34.
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of attorneys and agents as well as upon the Grand Duchy of Luxem-
burg, where the Court is sitting, though the contrary opinion has also
been expressed. 61
Whether a person is an attorney admitted to practice must be
determined according to his national law, which also governs the
effect of a disciplinary penalty pronounced against him by the dis-
ciplinary authorities of his home state. 2 The Court of Justice itself
has only limited disciplinary powers. After a hearing, it may exclude
an agent or attorney from a case if, by his conduct towards a judge,
an advocate-general, or the Registrar, he violates the dignity of the
Court.6 3 On occasion, the Court has informally and without a hearing
censured an attorney for intemperate statements made in a pleading
submitted to the Court.64 There is no rule prescribing that the pro-
fessional authorities of the attorney's home state must be notified by
the Court in such a case.
Customarily, a copy of the power of attorney given the party's at-
torney, or a copy of the letter of appointment given an agent is joined
to the first pleading filed by each side. However, in line with the
general practice in member states, a formal power of attorney is not
essential to the validity of proceedings before the Court, though it
should be presented if the attorney's power to act is contested.'
Corporations must show that the corporate officer who appointed the
attorney was authorized to do so.16
III. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Because a rich literature concerning the jurisdiction of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities is available in English,6 7 only a
'Mathijsen, Het aanvullend Reglernent van het Hof van Justitie van de E.G.K.S.,
31 NEDFELANDS JURISTENSLAD 859, 860-61 (1953). The Registrar must transmit
a copy of the calendar to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Luxemburg so
that the Luxemburg authorities may be aware of the presence of persons entitled
to various immunities. Instructions to the Registrar, art. 10. That rule would
tend to support Mr. Mathijsen's argument
'I. Nold, K. G. v. Haute Autorit , case 18-57, 5 Recuell 89 (1959) (procedure
in Court of Justice of European Communities initiated by German attorney subject
to Vertretungsverbot, which under his local law makes it punishable for him to
represent clients, but does not render his acts void is valid; case makes clear
that in federal states law to be consulted to determine whether attorney is entitled
to act is law of federal state where he exercises his profession).
'Rules of Procedure, art. 35. A stay must be granted in such a case to permit
the appointment of a new attorney.
" Acciaieria Ferriera di Roma v. Haute Autorit6 de la C.E.C.A., case 1-60,
6 Recueil 351 (1960).
" Barge v. Haute Autorit6 de la C.E.C.A., case 14-64, 11-4 Recueil 1 (1965).
Rules of Procedure, art. 38, § 5.
" See notes 1 and 2 supra. As to the Coal and Steel Treaty, see also SCEIxNGOLW,
THE RULE Op LAvW IN EuoE.x INTMRATION (1965).
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very brief and oversimplified summary of this topic is given here.
The basic function of the Court is the review of decisions, both in-
dividual (quasi-judicial) and general (quasi-legislative) issued by the
executive organs of the European Communities: High Authority of
the Coal and Steel Community, Commissions of the Economic Com-
munity and Euratom, and Councils of Ministers of the Communities.
Individual (quasi-judicial) decisions can be attacked on four grounds:
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the community organ having issued
the decision, violation of substantial procedural requirements, violation
of one of the treaties or of an implementing rule, and d6tournement
de pouvoir (use of a granted power for an improper purpose). Review
can be sought by Community organs (other than the one having
issued the decision), member states and individuals or corporations.
Under the Coal and Steel Treaty, however, private individuals and
corporations may seek a review of decisions only if they are enter-
prises engaged either in coal or steel production (or, to some extent
wholesaling), or associations of such enterprises. Community institu-
tions and member states can bring direct proceedings to have general
(quasi-legislative) decisions declared invalid. Others may do so only
to a very limited extent. Under the Coal and Steel treaty they must
show that there has been ditournement de pouvoir concerning them,
under the Common Market and Euratom treaties they must show
that what appears to be a general decision in fact concerns them
directly and individually. 8
The Court may also hear proceedings against Community organs
based on their failure to act where they had a duty to do so.69
The Court of justice is competent in tort actions against the Com-
munities. 70 It has no general contractual competence, unless such a
' In fact, the basic grant of power to the Court is contained in Coal and
Steel Treaty, art. 31, Treaty, art. 164 and Euratom Treaty, art. 136, which provide
that the Court shall insure the observance of law in the interpretation and application
of the respective treaties. But this seems to be mainly a statement of policy, since
the actual bases of jurisdiction are given in subsequent articles. It has been argued
that these articles have a negative implication: except when a treaty provides
otherwise, the Court may not review the exercise of discretion, unless there is an
abuse of discretion, which amounts to a violation of law. Diag, supra note 13,
at 150. The basic rules as to the review of decisions are found in Coal and Steel
Treaty, art. 33 (and cf. art. 80 for a definition of enterprises); Treaty, art.
173; Euratom Treaty, art. 146.
C'Coal and Steel Treaty, art. 35; Treaty, art. 175; Euratom Treaty, art. 148.
The pertinent Community organ (High Authority Commission) must first be invited
to act.
7' Coal and Steel Treaty, art. 40; Treaty, arts. 178, 215; Euratom Treaty, arts.
151, 188. There are some differences between the rules applicable to the Rome
and Paris treaties. Cf. Lagrange, The Non-contractual Liability of the Community
in the E.C.S.C. and in the E.E.C., 3 Com. Mxr. L. R v. 10 (1965).
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competence is conferred upon it by an appropriate clause in a con-
tract entered into by one of the Community organs.71
Most important in terms of the numbers of cases brought has been
the Court's right to hear disputes involving community organs and their
employees.72
In a sense, the Court is also an international tribunal. It may hear
disputes between member states of the European Communities con-
cerning the Community treaties.73 It is likewise competent to hear
suits through which member states are to be compelled to abide by
their treaty obligations. 74
Increasingly significant, national courts before which cases involving
the meaning of the European treaties or of regulations enacted by
Community organs are pending may, and sometimes must, stay their
proceedings and certify the question raised to the Court in Luxemburg
for a preliminary ruling.75
In some cases the Court must render what is more or less an ad-
visory opinion7 6 It also has a number of very specialized duties in
connection with the Euratom treaty 7 and some auxiliary Community
institutions such as the European Investment Bank."8 Finally, it must
authorize acts of execution (such as attachments) affecting Community
property.79
'Treaty, art. 181; Euratom Treaty, art. 153; Coal and Steel Treaty, art. 42.
Such clauses are sometimes mandatory: see Announcement of the High Authority
concerning research grants relating to coal, iron and steel, Amtsblatt, May 9, 1963,
p. 1433, art. 14.
'Treaty, art. 179; Euratom Treaty, art. 152; Regulation No. 31 of the Council
of Ministers concerning the status of salaried employees and the conditions of
work of other employees of December 18, 1961, Amtsblatt, June 14, 1962, p. 1385,
art. 91 (hereinafter cited as personnel statute). There is no corresponding provision
in the Coal and Steel Treaty, but the personnel statute applies to all three Communi-
ties.
In any case involving an alleged violation of a treaty obligation by a member
state and as to any matter related to the treaty by special submission. Coal and
Steel Treaty, art. 89; Treaty, arts. 170, 182; cf. art. 225; Euratom Treaty, arts.
142, 154. Disputes relating to the treaties are not to be submitted to a method of
settlement not provided in the treaties. Coal and Steel Treaty, art. 87; Treaty, art.
219; Euratom Treaty, art. 193.
"'Treaty, art. 93; Euratom Treaty, art. 82.
Treaty, art. 177; Euratom Treaty, art. 150; Coal and Steel Treaty, art. 41.
E.g., so-called small revision of the Coal and Steel Treaty, Coal and Steel
Treaty, art. 95; conformity of international agreements entered into by European
Economic Community with Rome Treaty, Treaty, art. 228. Cf. Euratom Treaty,
art. 103.
' E.g., Euratom Treaty, arts. 12, 21 (compulsory patent licenses); art. 18 (review
of decisions of arbitration board concerning licenses); arts. 81, 82 (control of
fissionable materials).
'E.g., Treaty, art. 180; Protocol on the Statute of the European Investment
Bank (annexed to the Treaty), art. 29.
" Protocol on Privileges and Immunities of the European Community, European
Atomic Energy Community and European Coal and Steel Community, art. 1.
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The Presiding Judge of the Court may grant a stay of an administra-
tive decision issued by a Community organ, as well as other provisional
relief."'
The powers of the Court are not the same in all the types of proceed-
ings mentioned. Particularly in suits by employees, damage actions
and suits to review fines imposed by Community organs it has a
so-called pleine juridiction.,8 This means that it may change or modify
the decision of the Community organ involved, can review the exercise
of discretion of such an organ and will feel less bound by the parties'
pleadings.8 2 In most other cases (said, following French administra-
tive law, to involve suits for excs de pouvoir) the Court may only
approve the administrative decision under attack, or declare it void
and remit the matter to the Community organ which issued it for
further proceedings. 8 Deference will be paid to the Community
organs' discretionary findings, though the Court is not ordinarily pre-
vented from examining the evidence relied on by the Community
body. 4 The 1965 Brussels agreement for the merger of the executives
of the three European Communities will remove existing differences
in the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice under the Coal and Steel
treaty on one hand and the Common Market and Euratom treaties
on the other hand."
Appendix II will give some idea of the various types of business
handled by the Court under its jurisdictional powers. The large number
of cases brought by employees has led to the suggestion for the creation
of an administrative tribunal for these matters, with a possible appel-
late jurisdiction in the Court of Justice of the European Communities.
1Statute, art. 36; Euratom Statute, art. 37; Coal and Steel Statute, art. 33.
Cf. Treaty, arts. 185, 186, 192; Euratom Treaty, arts. 157, 158; Coal and Steel
Treaty, art. 39.
' Personnel statute, art. 91 (suits by employees); Treaty, art. 172, Euratom
Treaty, art. 144, Coal and Steel Treaty, art. 36 (review of decisions imposing
fines) ; cf. note 70 supra.
E.g., Acciaierie Laminatoi Magliano Alphi v. Haute Autorit6, case 8-56,
3 Recuejl 179 (1957); Schmitz v. Communaut6 Economique Europ6enne, case
18-63, 10 Recueil 163 (1964).
6 Cf. SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADiINIsTRATioN LAW AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD
195, 196 (1954) ; Lagrange, Les Actions en Justice dans le Rigine des Covmiun-
autes Europienncs, 10 SOCIAA.L-EcoNoMISCHaE WETGEIMNG 81 (1962).
" Coal and Steel Treaty, art. 33, provides that the Court may not re-examine the
evaluation of economic facts or situations on which the High Authority has
based its decision or recommendation, unless the High Authority is accused of
having committed a ditournement de pouvoir or of having clearly misapplied the
treaty or a rule relating to its application. There is no corresponding provision
in the Rome treaties.
Treat" establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European
Communities, signed at Brussels, April 8, 1965, arts. 26, 30. See Houben, The Merger
of the Executives of the European Communities, 3 Co-M. MIKT. L. Ray. 37 (1965).
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IV. GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE PROCEDURE BEFORE THE
COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
A. Chracteristics of the Procedure before the Court
The Procedure before the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities is even farther removed in concept from the traditional
common-law procedure than civil procedure in Europe generally.""
There is no trial. Determination of facts and law is spread over a
considerable period of time. 7 According to the statutes of the Court,
the procedure consists of two phases, a written phase and an oral
phase.88 In practice, a third phase devoted to prooftaking may be
inserted between these two. During the written phase, parties exchange
writings in the nature of pleadings which contain their claims; written
evidence in the possession of the parties is submitted at that time.8
The Court then decides in closed session whether to call for the
production of non-documentary evidence, such as witnesses or experts,
or to begin the oral procedures at once. ° Finally comes the oral
procedure, in other words the hearing during which parties' counsel
argue at length about the facts and the law.9'
The procedure is clearly contradictory. Each side has the right to
answer the other, both in the oral and written procedure. No side
may rely on documents not made available to the opponent. Further-
more, the Court will ordinarily deal only with claims and allegations
raised by the parties." It raises issues on its own motion only in
special circumstances.93 On the other hand, the court plays a large
role in directing the procedure. Papers are served through the Regis-
trar. The Court may set or modify time limits for their submission.
" Cf. Cohn, Aspects of the Procedure Before the Court of Justice of the European
Communities, [1962] THE SOLICITOR 309.
' Or, as civil-law scholars would put it, the principle of "concentration" does
not apply. Nor does the principle of "immediacy." Proof may be taken before a
single judge of a panel (though this is done infrequently). MIGLIAZZA, LA CORTE
DI GiuSTIZlA DELLE COMMUNITA EuRoPEE 176 (1961).
' Statute, and Euratom Statute, art. 18; Coal and Steel Statute, art. 21.
See text infra, part V A.
' See text infra, part VI A.
' See text infra, part VII A. Proof phase and hearing phase may overlap, since
witnesses or experts may be heard during the oral procedure, and the Court occasion-
ally calls for additional evidence during the hearing.
" Gori et Sizaret, Conimentaire au r~glement de procidure de la Cour de
Justice des Compunautis Europiennes, COLLECTION JUPITER, TRAITP DE ROME, COM-
MENTAIRES ET RLGLEMENTS P 15.820 (1959) (hereinafter cited as Gori et Sizaret) ;
Riese, Die Verfahrensordnung des Gerichtshofes des Europaeischem Geneitschaft fuer
Kohle und Stahl, 6 NJ.W. 522 (1953). Cf. Societe nouvelle des usines de Pontlieu-
Aciries du Temple v. Haute Autoriti de la C.E.C.A., case 42-59, 7 Recueil 101
(1960) (party cannot use document it is willing to show to court but not to opponent).
' See infra part B of this section.
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The Court determines whether the parties' requests for the hearing
of witnesses, the conduct of an expertise or another method of proof
shall be complied with and may even seek out evidence on its own
motion. 9
4
In one respect the Court's procedure is somewhat analogous to our
own: especially in actions to obtain the invalidation of administrative
decisions specified conditions must be fulfilled, such as the existence
of dttournement de pouvoir, lack of jurisdiction, et cetera, before suit
can be brought. The procedure is therefore based more or less on
causes of actions in the common-law sense. The facts constituting the
various bases for suit must be alleged in the pleadings and proved.
A suit in which, e.g., ditournement de pouvoir is alleged, but without
sufficient particularization of the facts constituting it in the first plead-
ing is subject to dismissal."
B. The Court's Power to Act on Its Own Motion
Generally speaking the Court will deal only with issues which have
been properly raised by the parties. But sometimes, if strong public
policy is involved, it raises issues on its own motion." Thus it will
examine the adequacy of plaintiff's original pleading on its own motion
because an obscure or ambiguous pleading prevents proper further
proceedings. 9 In one case it has also checked whether the High
Authority supplied an adequate opinion justifying a decision taken by
it, since the absence of such an opinion would make it much more
difficult for the parties concerned to attack the decision and much
more difficult for the Court to determine whether the action taken
by the High Authority was lawful.0' In an earlier matter it did not
take such a course of action, however.99 In a situation in which the
High Authority may act only after having asked for advice of the
"Gori et Sizaret, at ff 15.820; Riese, supra note 92. Cf. Van Hemelrijk, Hel
rcgleinent van het Hof van Justitie der Europese Geneenschappen, 23 REC HTSxUNDIG
WEELAD 1437 (1960).
'Migliazza, Problemi Generali Relativi al Processo innanzi aila Corte di
Giusticia delle Communita Sopranazionali Europee, 26 STUDI URBINATI 181, 188
(1958).
BEcxER, DER EINFLuss DES FRANZOESISCHEx VERWVALTUNGSRECHTES AUF DEN
RECUTSSCHUTZ IN DEN EUROPAEISCHE GEIEiNSCHArvTEN 136 (1963). This is
entirely a matter of case law, except that Rules of Procedure, art. 92, provides
that the Court may always examine on its own motion whether the "non-waivable
conditions for a suit" are present.
' Soci 6t Fives Lille Cail v. Haute Autorit6 de la C. E. C. A., case 2-61, 7
Recuejl 559 (1961).
I. Nold, K.G. v. Haute Autorit6, case 18-57, 5 Recueil 89 (1959).
' Gouvernement de la R6publique Italienne v. Haute Autorit6, case 2-54, 1
Recueil 73 (1954).
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"Consultative Committee" the Court will likewise investigate on its
own motion whether this essential procedural requirement has been
observed.' Professor Bebr, who has discussed this matter in great
detail, feels there are additional issues the Court examines on its own
motion, such as whether it has jurisdiction, whether the administrative
decision brought to it for review is in fact a binding decision subject
to review, whether the Community organ whose decision is being
reviewed had jurisdiction and perhaps whether there has been a treaty
violation.' In other situations the Court is not generally willing to
act outside the scope of the pleadings. 2 Even costs are consistently
refused to the prevailing party unless it has asked for them in its
original petition.' It is worthy of some note that in several instances
in which the Court stated that it acted on its own motion, it did in fact
comply with a request by one of the parties, which had not been made
in due time and was thus not properly before the Court. 4 Hence
the Court's power to deal with matters on its own motion is in fact
a means which can be used to overcome the prohibition against the
raising of new matters after the original petition and answer have been
filed.
V. PARTIES
A. Capacity, Proper Parties
Because of the specialized jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of
the European Communities, member states and Community institu-
tions are generally defendants, while private individuals and business
firms are usually plantiffs. It may therefore be useful to discuss
capacity to sue separately for these two groups.
Problems do not usually arise as to member states. Clearly they
"
0 Ibid.
"' See generally Bebr, Antsermittlung umd Nachpruefungsbefugnis in Lichts
der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes der Europaeischen Gemeinschaften, ZERN
JAHRE RECHTSPRECHUING DES GERuCiTSHOFES DER EUROPAEISCHEN GESMEINSCHAFTEN
78 (1965).
'See, e.g., VAN REEPINGHENI ET ORIANNE at 34. But see Fiddelaar v. Com-
mission de Ia C. E. E., case 44-59, 6 Recueil 1077 (1960) (employee demanded
review of decision dismissing him, and long after original pleadings had been
filed he also asked for damages for wrongful dismissal. The Court said this was
too late, but in a case involving pleine jurisdiction the court could grant damages
even in the absence of a specific prayer for relief to that effect in the original
petition).
I E.g., Socit6 anonyme Usines Emile Henricot v. Haute Autorit6 de la
C. E. C. A, case 23-63, 9 Recueil 439 (1963); Acciaierie Ferriere e Fonderie di
Modena v. Haute Autorit6 de la C. E. C. A., case 16-61, 8 Recueil 547 (1962).
' See the cases cited notes 98 and 102 supra; cf. Socit6 Fives Lille Cail v.
Haute Autorit6 de la C. E. C. A., case 2-61, 7 Recueil 559 (1961).
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have capacity to sue and be sued before the Court. However, it is
usual to designate as party not the country as such, but its government.
While the treaties do not mention constituent states of countries having
a federal form of government, it might be noted that in one case,
several German Laender participated in the litigation. 10
Only the three European Communities, not their institutions or
organs (High Authority, Commissions, Councils of Ministers) have
legal personality. But as the institutions represent the three Com-
munities, 0 6 they must be mentioned as parties defendant, not the
Communities as such. However, the Court will correct a mere mis-
nomer.1 7 Suits may be brought against institutions common to the
three Communities, including the Court.'
In the case of private parties, capacity to sue seems to be governed
by the party's national law.'09 Problems have, however, arisen with
Associations designed to represent the interests of their members-
such as trade associations or associations of employees. Because of
the wording of the Coal and Steel treaty they may have the right
to sue under that treaty even if they have no such right under their
national law."0 For associations formed under Community law, such
as the Staff Committee, the Court has devised its own test for pro-
" Gouvernement de la R~publique F&derale d'Allemagne v. Haute Autorit6
de la C. E .C. A., case 3-58, 6 Recueil 117 (1960).
' Lagrange, La Cour de Justice de la Communautj Europenne du Charbon
et de l'Acier, (1954] REVUE DU DRoT PUBLIC ET BE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE 417-18.
As to the legal personality of the communities, see Coal and Steel Treaty, art.
6; Treaty, art. 210; Euratom Treaty, art. 184.
...The rule mentioned has been applied especially in suits by employees. In
such a case the official appointing authority (High Authority, Commission, etc.)
must be named as defendant. Boursin v. Haute Autorite de la C. E. C. A., case
102-63, 10 Recueil 347 (1964); Raponi v. Commission de la C. E. E., case 27-63,
10 Recueil 247 (1964) ; Schmitz v. Communaut6 Economique Europ6nne, case
18-63, 10 Recueil 163 (1964).
"If the Court is a party defendant, its Registrar represents it as agent, and the
Deputy Registrar acts as Registrar for that particular suit. Collotti v. Cour de
Justice des Communautis Europ6ennes, case 70-63, 10 Recueil 861 (1964). An
employee of the secretariat of the Councils of Ministers, which in fact but not
in form is an institution common to all three Communities, must bring his
action separately against the Council of each Community. Mueller v. Conseil
de la C. E. E. et Conseil de ]a C. E. E. A., case 28-64, 11 Recueil 307 (1965).
"C Thus German law determines whether the silent partners of a limited partner-
ship in liquidation because of the resignation of the only active partner may sue.
I. Nold, K. G. v. Haute Autorit6, case 18-57, 5 Recueil 89 (1959). The same is
probably true as to a corporation created by the merger of two other firms.
Mannesmann A. G. v. Haute Autorit6, case 4-59, 6 Recueil 241 (1960) ; cf., as to the
right of a deceased, Barge v. Haute Autorit6 de la C. E. C. A., case 18-62, 9
Recueil 525 (1963).
' See Coal and Steel Treaty, arts. 33, 48, granting associations of enterprises
a right to sue. Cf., as to the Treaty, which has no provision, Conf&ieration
nationale des producteurs de fruits et lgumes v. Conseil de la C. E. E., case
16-62, 8 Recueil 938 (1962).
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cedural capacity: to have such capacity, an association need not be
formally incorporated, but it needs at least limited autonomy and
responsibility. The Staff Committee whose duties were merely to
advise the institutions as to matters affecting their employees was
therefore not recognized as having capacity."'
B. The Requirement of "Interest"
No provision in the European treaties expressly provides that only
actual cases or controversies may be brought before the Court of
Justice of the European Communities. However, from various treaty
provisions and the general law of the member states authors univer-
sally derive the conclusion that parties must have a present "interest"
in order to be allowed to sue. This seems to mean that a party must
be able to point to some benefit it expects to derive from the liti-
gation." 2 The Court also proceeds on the assumption that a plaintiff
needs an "interest"' 3 but is quite liberal in defining that term. Thus,
under the Coal and Steel treaty an enterprise may attack a decision
concerning a different firm if it will affect that firm's competitive
potential." 4 A trade organization has sufficient interest if the interests
of its members are affected.", A corporation may attack a decision
addressed to a defunct corporation to which it has succeeded, even
though that decision could not have been executed against it at the
time.-" Indeed, in the case of administrative decision addressed to a
party having standing to attack it, its interest in doing so will usually
be presumed." 7 Member states and Community institutions need not
ordinarily show an "interest" to be able to sue." 8
' Lassalle v. Parlement Europien, case 15-63, 10 Recueil 98 (1963).
"2VAN REEPiNGREN ET ORIANNE, 34, 35; Gori et Sizaret, at 15.821c. See also
notes 116-18 infra.
' Thus a damage action may not be brought at a time when it is still quite
unclear whether plaintiff will be damaged at all. Acciaieria Ferriera di Roma
(Feram) v. Haute Autorit6 de la C. E. C. A., case 9-64, 11 Recueil 401 (1965).
"De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v. Haute Autorit6 de la
C. E. C. A., case 30-59, 7 Recueil 1 (1961) (Dutch mines may attack decision
of High Authority concerning premium paid to German government).
' Conf~deration nationale des producteurs de fruits et l6gumes v. Conseil de la
C. E. E., case 16-62, 8 Recueil 938 (1962) (central organization of French
Chambers of Agriculture).
'6 Mannesmann A. G. v. Haute Autorit6 de la C. E. C. A., case 4-59, 6 Recueil
241 (1960) (Plaintiff has interest because the decision attacked could be modified
by High Authority to substitute it as addressee). For a general listing of cases
on the matter, see Lagrange, Fonctionnement et R61e de la Cour de Justice des
Communauts Europ~ennes 21-24 (mimeo lecture Paris, Institut de Driot Compar6
n. d.).
.. MIGLIAZZA, LA CORTE DI GiUsTiziA DELLE COmmUNITk EUROPEE 2-17 (1961).
'°E.g., Daig, Die Gerichtsbarkeit in der Europaeischen Wirtschafts Genemn-
schaft und Atoingemeinschaft, 83 Aalc~v FulM OEFFENTLICHES RECHT 132, 167
(1958).
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C. Standing (Qualiti)
The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ties is not general, but limited to specified classes of cases. There-
fore, general procedural capacity is not necessarily enough; a person
bringing an action must also have standing as to the particular pro-
ceeding involved."0 Most importantly, under the Coal and Steel
treaty, except for member states and the Council, decisions of the
High Authority may be attacked by enterprises engaged in the pro-
duction of coal or steel within the Community, or Associations of
such enterprises. In cartel matters, however, wholesalers may also
act.'2 But consumers have no right of action, except in cartel mat-
ters,121 no matter how much they may be affected by High Authority
acts, nor is a stockholder in an enterprise in any better position. 22
On the other hand, an enterprise engaged in the production of steel
has standing to sue, even if the litigation involves coal, and vice
versa.123 There is no restriction on the persons who may bring damage
actions under the Coal and Steel treaty. 24
The Common Market and Euratom treaties do not restrict the
number of persons who may attack individual (quasi-judicial) deci-
sions of Community organs directed to them; any person so affected
may seek relief from the Court. However, decisions which are of a
general nature (quasi-legislative decisions) and individual decisions
directed to others may be attacked only by persons individually and
directly concerned. 25 This seems to mean that the plaintiff must be
concerned in a manner different from others in the same general class.
Thus an importer of grain cannot contest a decision addressed to his
government concerning a levy to be imposed upon imported grain,
even if he is the largest, and perhaps not even if he is the only
" MIGLIAZZA, op. cit. supra note 117, at 213.
' Coal and Steel Treaty, arts. 33, 35, 80. Associations of enterprises may sue
even if they also have an independent commercial purpose. Socigt6 Rh6nane
d'exploitation et de manutention "Sorema" v. Haute Autorit6 de ]a C. E. C. A., case
67-63, 10 Recueil 293 (1964).
' Coal and Steel Treaty, art. 63.
' Schlieker v. Haute Autorit6 de Ia C. E. C. A., case 12-63, 9 Recueil 173
(1963).
' Groupement des Industries Sidrurgiques Luxembourgeoises v. Haute Autor-
it, ase 7-54, 2 Recueil 53 (1956).
" Coal and Steel Treaty, art. 40; but see art. 34(1) (damage due to improper
decision of High Authority may be claimed only by enterprise). On the definition
of enterprise under the Coal and Steel Treaty see also Hammes, La Cour de
Justice des Communaut6s Europgennes, 38-40 (mimeo lecture Luxemburg 1959);
BEcKE_, op cit. supra note 96, at 67-69; RicEMoNr, COMmUNAUTE EUROPfENNE
DU CHaRmoN ET DE L'Acm, LA CouR DE JusTIcE 476-80 (1954).
" Treaty, art. 173; Euratom Treaty, art. 146.
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importer . 2 But in another case a decision by the Commission directed
to the German government concerned only the very few grain im-
porters who had obtained import licenses on one particular day. It
was held that they were individually and directly concerned and hence
had standing to sue. 27 Similarly, article 91 of the Personnel statute
provides that the Court must decide all disputes between the Com-
munities and the persons mentioned in the Personnel statute. It has
been held, however, that an applicant for a position, though not a
person mentioned in the statute, has standing to attack a decision
affecting him. 28
VI. THE WRITTEN PROCEDURE
A. General Rules
The first phase of the procedure before the Court, the written pro-
cedure, consists of an exchange of four writings, the original petition,
by which the action is started, the answer to that petition, a reply and
a rebutter, though the last two may be waived.' 2 The written pro-
cedure is quite essential: as has been mentioned, the Court will not
ordinarily deal with matters not mentioned in the written procedure.33
To that extent the parties' writings perform the issue-delimiting func-
tion of pleadings and will therefore be referred to as pleadings here.
But unlike American pleadings, they also contain detailed discussions
of the legal contentions of the parties and proof offers. So they are
quite long, twenty typed pages is not unusual. Each party must
annex all documents on which it relies to its pleadings.3 Hence the
pleadings also serve to bring the evidence and the legal arguments of
the parties before the Court and are thus not a mere means of pre-
paring a later trial (which does not exist before the Court), but an
essential part of the Court's fact and law-finding process, somewhat in
the manner of American briefs.
Certain rules are common to all four pleadings: they must be signed
Getreide-Import Gesellschaft v. Commission de la C. E. E., case 38-64, 11
Recueil 263 (1965); cf. Soci~t6 anonyme beige "Glucoseries runies" v. Commis-
sion de la C. E. E., case 1-64, 10 Recueil 811 (1964) (only Belgian exporter of
glucose to France lacks standing to attack decision concerning glucose imports
addressed to French government).
' Alfred Toepfer v. Commission de la C. E. E., case 106-63, 11 Recueil 525
(1965). See generally Daig, supra note 118, 168-73.
Vandevyvere v. Parlement europ~en, case 23-64, 11 Recueil 205 (1965).
Statute and Euratom Statute, art. 18; Coal and Steel Statute, art. 21; Rules
of Procedure, art. 41.
o See test at part III B supra.
Cf. Rules of Procedure, arts. 37, 38.
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by the party's agent or counsel and must be submitted to the Registrar
in one original and two copies for the Court, and as many additional
copies as there are parties on the other side. Any documents relied
on must be annexed in a folder which contains a list of them. If docu-
ments are very bulky, it is sufficient to file one copy in the Registrar's
office and annex only excerpts to the copies of the pleadings. Other-
wise, complete copies of all documents should be annexed to all copies
of the pleadings.'32 All pleadings received must be entered by the
Registrar upon its official register. This constitutes formal proof of
their receipt.1 33 The Registrar then serves the copies destined for
the other parties by sending them (with a covering letter) by regis-
tered mail, return receipt requested if the party must be served out-
side of Luxemburg; if the party concerned resides in Luxemburg or
has appointed a person authorized to accept service of papers there
(as is usually the case), service is made by sending a messenger with
the pleading and two copies of a covering letter, one of which the
recipient (or his agent for service of process) is asked to return as a
receipt. 134
B. The Petition
Plaintiff starts his suit by filing his first pleading, the petition, with
the Registrar."3 There is not separate summons. The statutes and
rules regulate to some extent the formal contents of the petition.
Thus it must contain the name and address of the plaintiff, the name
of defendant and an indication of the capacity in which the person
having signed it (attorney, agent) acts. The administrative decision
to be reviewed must be given in full; if the suit is brought on the
"' Rules of Procedure, art. 37. As to the rule that pleadings must be signed by
an attorney (or agent) see also Officine Elettromeccaniche Ing. A. Merlini v.
Haute Autorit6 de la C. E. C. A., case 108-63, 11-1 Recueil 1 (1965) (plaintiff's
attorney submitted a memorandum addressed to him by plaintiff in lieu of a formal
reply, stating in a covering letter that he had no time to prepare a formal reply;
held, such a memorandum may not be considered). The language rules must, of course
be compiled with. See text at part II D supra.
" Rules of Procedure, art. 15; Instructions to Registrar, arts. 12-16.
.. Rules of Procedure, arts. 16, 79; Instructions to Registrar, art. 3. As to the
appointment of an agent for receipt of process, see also text keyed to note 136 infra.
In Luxemburg, service is effectuated quite informally. The messenger drops the
envelope with the pleading and two copies of the covering letter in the recipient's
mailbox. No attempt at personal service is made. If one copy of the covering
letter is not returned to the court within a reasonable time (which is very rare), a
registered letter, return receipt requested, is sent.reStatute and Euratom Statute, art. 19, and Coal and Steel Statute, art. 22,
provide that the petition is addressed to the Registrar. In practice, it is usual to
use the heading: "To the Presiding Judge and the Judges of the Court of Justice of
the European Communities ... " VAN REuEPiNGEEN T ORIANNE 36.
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ground that a Community organ did not act when it should have,
documentary evidence must be annexed to show when such action
was requested. In addition, as mentioned, all documents relied on
must be annexed. There must also be a listing of all proof offers
(examination of witnesses or experts, etc.) suggested by the party.
The plaintiff must appoint a person in Luxemburg to receive service
of all further papers in the suit, and indicate in his petition what
person he has appointed. It is usual to annex to the petition the letter
of acceptance of the person so appointed. Corporate plaintiffs must
also include a copy of their by-laws and a document showing the
power of attorney given the corporation's lawyer was issued by a duly
qualified officer. Finally, a document showing that the attorney having
prepared the petition is a member in good standing of the bar in one of
the Community countries must be joined with all the papers. It is the
duty of the Registrar to examine whether the plaintiff has appointed
an agent for service of process in Luxemburg and whether all the
required documents have been annexed. If the petition is defective
in that respect, he must so inform the plaintiff (or rather his counsel)
and give him a reasonable time to supply the missing items. If the
items are not supplied within a reasonable time, he should inform
the President of the Court. The Court may dismiss the petition in such
a case but this never seems to have happened." 6
There are few rules governing the substantive contents of the peti-
tion. It must contain a prayer for relief, the "object of the suit" and
the "bases of the suit.' 13 7 Little difficulty has been encountered in
defining the prayer for relief. This includes the plaintiff's demand that
he be given damages, that an administrative decision aggrieving him
be declared void, that he be awarded costs. If the plaintiff wishes to
rely on a measure of proof for which Court permission is required
(such as an examination of witnesses), a request to that effect must
be contained in the prayer. This is usually done in an alternative
form-the Court is asked to find for plaintiff on the basis of the
documentary evidence presented, but if it should not wish to do so,
then it should order an examination of witnesses, etc. Unfortunately,
however, the terms object of the suit (Streitgegenstand, objec du
litige) and bases of the suit (Klagegruende, moyens) though used
"'Statute and Euratom Statute, art. 19; Coal and Steel Statute, art. 22; Rules
of Procedure, arts. 37, 38; Instructions to Registrar, art. 5; Gori et Sizaret at
ir 15.822.
' Statute and Euratom Statute, art. 19; Coal and Steel Statute, art. 22.
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in the procedural writings of all the member states, have no entirely
uniform content there.138 Hence, the rules as to the substantive con-
tents of the petition have been developed mainly through case law.
Especially in proceedings to have the decision of a Community organ
declared void, the treaties provide strict conditions which must be
complied with; an attack is possible only if there is a lack of juris-
diction, violation of treaty, ditournement de pouvoir, et cetera. Hence
the petition must make it clear that prima facie, the plaintiff comes
within at least one of these conditions. 39 He need not necessarily
indicate the treaty article on which he relies (though this is custom-
ary),140 nor is it absolutely essential to state in so many words that
the action is based on ditournement de pouvoir or the like. However,
the petition must make it clear in some manner on which ground it
is based and it must contain sufficient facts and reasoning to make it
appear that the plaintiff comes within the scope of the ground used
by him." Thus the Court has defined ditournement de pouvoir as
either an intentional use of powers for a purpose not intended or "a
lack of foresight or prudence of a serious nature equivalent to a lack
of recognition of the legal purpose (of the power granted), leading
to a pursuit of goals other than those for which the granted powers
were given." If the plaintiff wishes to rely on ditournement de pou-
voir, he must therefore show that he comes within the terms of this
definition. 42 Likewise, if fault is alleged, there must be some sub-
stantiation of the facts amounting to fault,'143 and when substantial
damages are requested for wrongful dismissal, a mere statement that
this sum is proper in view of plaintiff's age, past services and pro-
fessional standing is insufficient.'1 4 The discussion in the petition may
be rather brief, 4 ' but pleading a matter by merely incorporating
'For a comparative discussion see Gerbrandy, De regeling van de procedure
bif het Hof vat Justitie vat; de Europese Gememeschappen, 1 SOCIAAL-EcoNoMIscHE
WETGVmcG EuRoPA 87, 92-94 (No. 4 1960).
' Cf. MIGLIAZZA, op. cit. supra note 117, at 243.
Societa Industriale Acciaierie San Michele v. Haute Autorit6 de la C. E.
C. A., case 2-63, 9 Recueil 661 (1963) (no need to refer to art. 36 of Coal and
Steel Treaty since petition makes it clear it is for review of pecuniary sanctions
of High Authority and this is only possible relevant article); Algera v. Assemble
Commune, case 7-56, 3 Recueil 81, (1957).
1.1 Socit6 Fives Lille Cail v. Haute Autorit6, case 2-61, 7 Recueil 559 (1961).
E.g., Chambre syndicale de la sid6rurgie fran~aise v. Haute Autorit6 de la
C. E. C. A., case 3-64, 11 Recueil 567 (1965).
" Meroni & Co. v. Haute Autorit6 de la C. E. C. A., case 46-59, 8 Recueil
783 (1962).
. Luhleich v. Commission de la C. E. E. A., case 68-63, 11 Recueil 727(1965). The court is more lenient if nominal damages only are demanded.
" Forges de Clabecq, S. A. v. Haute Autoriti de la C. E. C. A., case 14-63, 9
Recueil 719 (1963) (sufficient, in attacking High Authority decision imposing
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by reference a pleading in a different but similar case handled by the
same attorney is not possible. 146
In practice, the format of the petition seems to vary somewhat
depending upon the nationality of the attorney submitting it. Gen-
erally, it starts with the purely formal recitals required by the rules,
followed by a part entitled "the facts" in which a chronological account
of the events leading up to the litigation is given. The next part is
usually entitled "the law." It will ordinarily contain a discussion of
each separate basis for suit (such as violation of treaty, detournement
de pouvoir, et cetera) and explain why plaintiff is entitled to prevail
under each of these grounds. There is no requirement that each of
these grounds be separately numbered, but this is frequently done. In
the end follows the prayer for relief, though some attorneys seem to
start out their petition with the prayer for relief. It is possible for
several plaintiffs to submit one collective petition. 47 French attorneys
customarily submit pleadings consisting of numerous subordinate
clauses introduced by the word Attendu (Whereas), but this somewhat
awkward form of pleading is not required, nor used universally.
As has been noted previously, as soon as each petition arrives, it
must be entered by the Registrar upon his register. At that time an
index number is assigned to the case which is used to identify it on
all later occasions. The index number consists of two figures separated
by a dash, one indicating the number of the case within the current
year and the other the year (1-66, 2-66, et cetera). The Registrar then
serves a copy of the petition upon the defendant unless he considers
it incomplete and requests the plaintiff to complete it, in which case
it will be served when completed. 48
If the petition does not concern an employee matter, and the case
levy under scrap equalization scheme to say it is in violation of treaty and applicable
regulations because it imposes a levy for scrap bought before the effective date
of the pertinent regulation). But see Soci&t des fonderies de Pont-i-Mousson v.
Haute Autorit6, case 14-59, 5 Recueil 445 (1959) (party alleging scrap levy hurt
competitive position must give some figures on decline in business due to tax).
" Prakash v. Commission de la C. E. E. A., case 19-63, 11 Recueil 677
(1965); Soci6t des Charbonnages de Beeringen v. Haute Autorit6, case 6-55, 2
Recueil 323 (1956).
l'Alternative requests may include a request that decision aggrieving the
plaintiff be declared void or that he receive damages. Several plaintiffs may
submit one collective petition if they attack the same decision. See VAr
REEPINGE-N ET ORIANNE at 36-37.
"In addition, the Registrar must see to it that a notice that the suit has been
brought appears in the official Gazette of the Communities. The notice gives the
date the suit was brought and contains the names of the parties, the object to
the litigation and the prayer for relief. It is intended to enable any interested
parties to intervene. See Rules of Procedure, arts. 15, 16, 39; Instructions to
Registrar, arts. 3, 12-16. Cf. note 136 supra.
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is therefore one for decision by the full Court, the President of the
Court then receives the petition, assigns the case to one of the panels to
handle any proof proceedings and selects a reporting judge to take
charge of the case. In practice, assigning the case to one of the
panels for proof proceedings has very little significance, because proof
proceedings are usually conducted by the full Court. However, the
reporting judge must always be selected from the panel to which the
case has been assigned' 49 and in addition the case is automatically
assigned to the advocate-general attached to the panel when it is
assigned to a particular panel.5 0
C. The Answer
Within one month from the day he has received a copy of the
petition, the defendant must file an answer in the Registrar's office. 5'
This time period is increased for defendants outside Luxemburg." 2
In computing it, the day on which the defendant has received the
petition is not counted,5 but the answer must be filed on the last
available day.154 It may be sent to the Registrar by mail, or in any
other way, but in determining timeliness only the day of arrival in
the Registrar's office, not the day of mailing, controls. The President
of the Court may extend the defendant's time to answer.15
The formal requirements for the answer are substantially the same
as those for the petition." 6 Under the Coal and Steel Statute, a
Community organ which is a defendant must annex to its answer not
"' Rules of Procedure, art. 24; cf. art. 44, § 2. See also Tizzano, La Corte di
Giustizia, 3 QUADRI, MONACO, TRABUCCHr, COmmENTARiO CE at 1202-03.
' Cf. text accompanying note 34 supra.
... Rules of Procedure, art. 40, § 1.
"' Rules of Procedure, art. 81; Decision of the court relating to time periods
of March 3, 1959, Amtsblatt, Jan. 18, 1960, p 46. It provides the following additional
time periods: for parties residing in Belgium, two days; in Germany, continental
France and Holland, six days; Italy, ten days; the rest of Europe, fifteen days; and
all other areas, one month. These additional time periods are available not only for
the service of the answer, but apply in all situations in which there is a time
limit of some sort.
a Rules of Procedure, art. 80. If the last day is a Sunday or legal holiday,
filing on the first working day is proper.
... In other words, the time periods before the Court are not franc, as generally
in French civil procedure. Cf. Van Hemelrijk, Het reglement van het Hof van
Justitie van de Europese Gemeenschappen, [1960] RECHTSKUNDIG WMXBLA cols.
1437, 39. The rule applies to all time periods.
t Rules of Procedure, art. 40. The request to the President of the Court is
made by simple letter. It seems to be granted as a matter of routine. As to the
rule that date of arrival, not date of mailing controls, see Soc. Industriale Met-
allurgica di Napoli v. Haute Autorit6 de la C. E. C. A., case 36-58, 5 Recueil
331 (1959).
' Rules of Procedure, art. 40.
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only the documents on which it relies but all documents in its file
pertaining to the case. 1sT In the case of litigation involving employees,
the personnel file must be submitted to the Court."8
If the defendant fails to submit an answer in due time, a default
judgment may be obtained, which is subject to a special procedure for
reopening.' 59 So far, the Court has never had to render a judgment by
default.
The rules as to the substantive contents of the answer are even
sketchier than those concerning the petition. It must contain the
factual and legal grounds on which it is based, the prayers for relief
of the defendant and, in an appropriate case, his proof offers. 00 There
is no longer a requirement that defendant must deny each factual
allegation of plaintiff.' 1
In practice, the answer will obviously contain a refutation of plain-
tiff's factual and legal arguments, usually point by point, in the same
order in which they have been presented by defendant. However,
defendant may also wish to raise affirmative defenses such as lack of
jurisdiction and the like. If he includes such points together with his
points on the merits, all matters will ordinarily be dealt with together
in the Court's final judgment. If the defendant wishes to avoid liti-
gating the merits, he may submit a pleading containing only his pro-
cedural defenses (exceptions, prozesshindernde Einreden). After hav-
ing given plaintiff a chance to reply to these defenses, the Court will
then hold a hearing and render a decision on the matter. If the
defense is well founded, the case can thus come to a quick conclusion.
However, the Court is not bound to render a separate decision on pro-
cedural defenses. It may reserve decision until the time of the decision
on the merits and direct the parties to proceed accordingly.0 2 The
Court will do this if the merits and procedural defenses are closely
related, as they often areY.3 In the case of non-waivable defenses,
the Court may act on its own motion. Further proceedings are similar
to those taken when procedural defenses are raised by defendant. 1
Unfortunately, the Rules of Procedure contain no definition of
' Coal and Steel Statute, art 23.
" Personnel statute, art. 26, § 7.
F Statute, art. 38, Euratom Statute, art. 39; Coal and Steel Statute, art. 35.
" Rules of Procedure, art. 40.
9 See Rules of Procedure of 1953, J. 0., March 7, 1953, pp. 37-55.
'
2 Rules of Procedure, art. 91.
.''E.g., Alfred Toepfer v. Commission de la C. E. E., case 106-63, 11 Recueil
5? ( 65). Cf. Plaumann & Co. v. Commission de la C. E. E. case 25-62, 9 Recueil
197 (1963).
" Rules of Procedure, art. 92.
(VOL. 41: 383
COMMON MARKET SYMPOSIUM
procedural defenses (exceptions, prozesshindernde Einreden) and, in-
deed, use somewhat inconsistent terminology. Nor is the distinction
between various types of procedural defenses and defenses on the
merits always very clear in the law of the member states.'65 Presum-
ably, procedural defenses which may be raised separately include at
least lack of jurisdiction in the Court, defective pleading, running of
the period of limitations, absence of a matter which may be reviewed
by the Court and lack of legal capacity, standing or "interest" in the
plaintiff. 6 To what extent these may be raised by the Court on its
own motion has been discussed elsewhere. 67 In suits before the Court
of Justice of the European Communities the parties are usually anxious
to obtain a decision on the merits in order to have their legal relations
clarified. Hence purely formalistic defenses (e.g., failure to include
all required documents with the petition) are rarely raised by defen-
dants."" Affirmative defenses raised are usually closely related to
the merits (such as lack of standing to act under the pertinent treaty),
though in addition defendants rarely fail to raise the running of the
pertinent limitation period.
D. Reply and Rebutter; Possibility to Raise New Matters
Following the receipt of the answer, plaintiff may file a reply and
defendant subsequently a rebutter. The time for filing these papers
is set by the President of the Court by order.'69 As to the form of
these documents the general rules apply. Obviously, the reply is used
by the plaintiff to refute the points and arguments presented in defen-
dant's answer, and the rebutter to refute the reply.
Reply and rebutter are designed primarily as a means of affording
the parties an opportunity to delineate their original position in greater
detail especially as to points emphasized by the other side. These two
' Thus Rules of Procedure, art. 91, speaks of ezceptiois, proaesshindernde
Einrcdeo, while art. 92, mentioning situations in which the Court may act on its
own motion, speaks of fins de non-recevoir, Prozessvoraussetzungen. Procedural
authors in the member states have frequently attempted to define these terms in
their own national law, but they remain hazy. Thus it is not quite clear to what
extent the Court meant to impose different rules by the different terminology in
arts. 91 and 92. See generally VAN REEPiNGHEN 'r ORIAxxE 48, 49; MIGLIAZZA,
op. cit. supra note 117, at 176, 253; Gerbrandy, supra note 138, at 99-100. Under the
Rules of Procedure of 1953, procedural defenses were waived unless raised im-
mediately but as noted above, defendants may now combine procedural defenses
and defenses on the merits.
"' De Soto, Prozessvoraussetzungen, Zzux JAHaRE RECXHTSPRECHUNG DES GER CHT-
SHOFFS DER EUROPAISCHEN GnrNscirAFTmR 48, 51-56 (1965).
"" See text at part III B supra.
'DDe Soto, supra note 166, at 50.
Rules of Procedure, art. 41. Cf. note 129 supra.
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pleadings may be used only to a limited extent to change the parties'
original positions. According to the Rules of Procedure, reply and
rebutter may contain new proof offers, if there is a reason for the
late presentation of these,' but new moyens (Kiagegruende) may
be raised only if they are based on factual or legal elements which
came to light after the start of proceedings. 17' Unfortunately, there
is no very clear definition of the term moyens (Klagegruende). In
this context it seems to refer to the various bases (such as violation
of treaty, lack of jurisdiction, d~tournement de pouvoir) for bringing
a case before the Court? 2 Thus, when the High Authority, faced with
a petition for the review of one of its decisions argues that in fact
there was no decision, the plaintiff may not state in his reply that in
such a case his suit is intended to compel the High Authority to act. 3
Similarly, a person seeking damages for his wrongful dismissal may
not claim in the reply that he is also entitled to reimbursement for
laboratory equipment purchased at his own expense. 4 On the other
hand, existing moyens may be supported by new arguments, and the
Court has been rather liberal in defining what an argument, as opposed
to a moyen, is.' 7 5 Further, the Court sometimes avoids the rule pro-
hibiting the raising of new points by holding that a point was raised
"impliedly" in an earlier pleading.176
The prohibition against the raising of new points is irrelevant when-
ever the Court is empowered to raise a matter on its own motion.
In such a case the Court can say that it raises the point the party is
foreclosed from asserting. This is true especially in matters affected
' See text keyed to note 182 infra.
' Rules of Procedure, art. 42 § 2. As to what are newly arising matters, see
Ley v. Commission de la C. E. E., case 12-64, 11 Recueil 143 (1965) (Commission,
in defending action by employee relied on art. 29 of personnel statute, arguing that
it gave it wide discretionary powers; this argument held to enable plaintiff to
argue for first time in reply Commission had violated certain provisions of art. 29).
'
T As noted earlier, the term inoyens (Klagegruende) is nowhere defined in the
Rules of Procedure, nor does this term have a uniform meaning throughout the
Community countries, or even within one country. See VAN REEPINGHEN ET
ORIANNE 38, 39; Gerbrandy, supra note 138.
'De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v. Haute Autorit6, case
17-57, 5 Recueil 9 (1959).
'Luhleich v. Commission de la C.E.E.A., case 68-63, 11 Recueil 727
(1965). Cf. Rauch v. Commission de la C. E. E., case 16-64, 11 Recueil 179
(1965) (raising alleged additional error in procedure of appointing body in
reply not possible).
E.g., Compagnie des Hauts Fournatux de la Chasse v. Haute Autorit6 case
2-57, 4 Recueil 129 (1958) (in petition and reply where plaintiff argued there was
ditournemnent de pouvoir, held: somewhat different arguments as to what constituted
ditournement de pouvoir possible in these two pleadings).
'
T 6Degreef v. Communaut6 Economique Europ~enne, case 80-63, 10 Recueil
767 (1964); see also Plaumarn & Co. v. Commission de la C. E. E., case 25-62,
9 Recueil 197 (1963).
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by public policy,'77 but in cases involving pleine juridiction the Court
assumes that it has a rather far-reaching power to act on its own
motion in relation to damages also.'78
It is standard practice for parties to include in their petition or
answer a clause that they reserve the right to raise additional points if
necessitated by claims made by the other side. This seems a super-
fluous statement. A reservation of the right to raise any additional
points is presumably ineffective. 7
VII. EVIDENCE
A. General Rules Concerning Evidence
As noted there is no trial in our sense before the Court of Justice
of the European Communities. The statutes and rules of procedure
provide the following methods of proof: documentary evidence, sub-
mission of questions and demands for information to parties and
Community institutions and member states by the Court, the hearing
of witnesses, investigations by experts, and the visitation of the lo-
cality involved in the litigation by the Court.' Parties submit docu-
mentary evidence by annexing it to their pleadings.' 8" If a party
wishes to offer any other kind of evidence, or to obtain an order com-
pelling the other side to submit documents it has not disclosed, the
party must include a clause containing such a proof offer in the prayer
for relief contained in its first pleading; it may be contained in the
reply or rebutter if there is a valid excuse for the late submission."8 2
As a practical matter, proof offers are usually phrased in the form of
an alternative prayer for relief. Since the plaintiff frequently ignores
when he files his petition what facts will be contested, the proof offers
in the petition are often phrased in very general terms, and made
more precise in the reply. 83
After the exchange of pleadings is completed, the Court (or panel,
'E.g., Gouvernement de la R6publique Italienne v. Haute Autorit , 2-54, 1
Recueil 73 (1954). Cf. part III B supra.
" E.g., Fiddelaar v. Commission de la C. E. .., case 44-59, 6 Recueil 1077 (1960).
a'Cf. Vandevyvere v. Parlement europ~en, case 23-64, 11 Recueil 205 (1965).
' ' Statute, art. 21; Euratom Statute, art. 22; Coal and Steel Statute, art. 23;
Rules of Procedure, art. 45.
' See note 131 supra.
Rules of Procedure, arts. 38, 40, 42. Cf. Gouvernement de la Rdpublique
Italienne v. Haute Autorit6, case 2-54, 1 Recueil 73 (1954) (request that Court order
High Authority to submit documents acceptable, though late, because plaintiff could
assume High Authority would comply with Rules of Procedure, art. 23, and submit
its file spontaneously).
' Gerbrandy, supra note 138, at 97.
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in an employee matter) has a preliminary conference on the case.
It is not open to the parties or public. The reporting judge presents
a report, and the advocate-general his submissions. The Court then
decides whether there should be any proof measures and renders an
order accordingly."8 4 The order contains no reasons. Formal proof
measures, such as the examination of witnesses or the appointment of
an expert are ordered rather infrequently, but requests for information
from the parties, or for documents are more numerous. If a proof
measure, such as the examination of a witness, is ordered it is ordi-
narily carried out by the full Court, although it may be delegated to a
panel or even the reporting judge." 5 The Court's order concerning
proof which comes after the exchange of the pleadings is in no way
conclusive. The rules provide that the Court may order additional
proof at the time of the formal hearing. 8 6 Thus an attorney whose
proof offers have been rejected initially can still present argument
concerning them and hope to change the Court's mind. As a practical
matter, the presentation of proof may be a drawn-out process even
if no new evidence is ordered presented at the hearing. It frequently
happens that the original order of the Court asks the parties to submit
certain documents; after they have arrived, the Court may decide to
submit requests for information to the parties. Or the Court may
order the examination of witnesses, and then request information
from the parties.8 7 Then only will the formal hearing take place.
In deciding whether to comply with a proof offer, the Court does
not seem to be guided by formal rules of evidence's--though this is
not very easy to determine because the original order dealing with
proof is without opinion, and remains unpublished. But apparently
the Court will reject proof offers if the proposed evidence appears
superfluous because the documentary (or other) evidence already in
the file is sufficient to decide the case or because the proposed evidence
' The rules provide that the reporting judge is to present his report within
the time limit fixed by the President; in practice, he presents it whenever he is
ready. The report should deal only with the question of proof measures; in fact
it will be almost impossible to avoid some preliminary discussion of the merits.
See Rules of Procedure, art. 44. Cf. Gerbrandy, supra note 138, at 89.
'Rules of Procedure, art. 44 § 2; cf. art 45, § 3.
' Rules of Procedure, art. 60.
'There are numerous instances. See, e.g., Barge v. Haute Autorit de la
C. E. C. A., case 18-62, 9 Recueil 525 (1963); Officine Ellettromeccaniche Ing.
A. Merlini v. Haute Autorit6 de la C. E. C. A., case 108-63, 11 Recueil 1 (1965).
' Except as noted in the second part of his paragraph, there seem to be no
real exclusionary rules (such as hearsay) and few rules concerning the weight of
evidence. See the sections on documentary evidence and witnesses infra. Cf. Gori
et Sizaret 15.825; MIGLIAZZA, LA CoRTE DI GiuSnzIA DELLE COSmuNITA EUROPEE
179 (1961).
(VOL. 41 : 383
COMMON MARKET SYMPOSIUM
deals with a part of the case which must, in any event, be rejected for
another reason. 9
Sometimes the Court's decision turns on questions of burden of
proof. In accordance with general rules, the Court holds that the
party who has the affirmative of an issue (thus usually the plaintiff)
has the burden of proof.9 0 When the party having the burden of
proof and apparently able to prove its case at least in a preliminary
way by annexing documents to its pleadings fails to do so, the Court
is often disinclined to permit it to prove its case by the use of more
formalized procedures. 9
However, in view of the absence of a trial and of a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a prima facie case, burden of proof does
not have the importance it has with us. Furthermore, the Court is
not bound by the proof offers of the parties. While it will not investi-
gate facts not mentioned by at least one of the parties, nor ordinarily
look into a matter on which both sides agree, it may reject proof
offers by the parties and seek to obtain proof in a different way.'92
In one case in which the value of a diploma issued by a private
school in Belgium was in issue, the Court rejected a proof offer con-
cerning the examination of witnesses and, instead, directed its Regis-
trar to request Belgian educational authorities for information on
this point. 93 On occasion the Court has taken judicial notice of
facts.'9 4
B. Documentary Evidence
Documentary evidence in the possession of a party is submitted by
being annexed to the pleadings.9 5 The rules concerning translations
and copies must, of course, be observed.'96 If some excuse for the
'Fonzi v. Commission de la C. E. E. A., case 27-64, 11 Recueil 615 (1965);
Socit anonyme Usines Emile Henricot v. Haute Autorit6 de la C. E. C. A., case
23-63, 9 Recueil 439 (1963).
" Gori et Sizaret 15.825; MIGLIAZZA, op. cit. .supra note 188, at 180.
"tBarge v. Haute Autorit6 de la C. E. C. A., case 14-64, 11 Recueil 1 (1965)(no proof by witnesses allowed as to scrap produced by plaintiff himself, since he
failed to annex books of account or the like to petition); cf. Soci 6t nouvelle des
usines de Pontlieu-Acidries du Temple v. Haute Autorit6 de la C. E. C. A.,
case 42-59, 7 Recueil 101 (1960).
... MIGLIAZZA, op. cit. supra note 188, at 239; God et Sizaret 1 15.825; Korsch,
Comnents on Bebr, ZEHN JAHRE RECHTSPRECHtuTG DES GERICHTSH OFES DnR EuRop-
AEISCHEN GEEINSciAFTEN 129-31 (1965).
113 Van Nuffel v. Commission de Ia C. E. E. A., case 93-63, 10 Recueil 961(1964).I' Plaumann & Co. v. Commission de la C. E. E., case 25-62, 9 Recueil 261 (1962).
'. Rules of Procedure, art. 37.
" Apparently, a party should submit as many copies of documents as it submits
pleadings, unless bulky documents are involved, in which case only one copy need
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delay exists, it seems possible to submit documents after the exchange
of pleadings is terminated.'x ' There are no limitations on the types of
written evidence that can be presented in this manner. Even self-
serving memoranda prepared by a party, or a letter submitted by a
person unable to testify because of absence were admitted, though
they were apparently not considered as having full probative value.'
All documents submitted to the Court are, of course, made available
to the other side.'99
Generally speaking, the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities is not bound by any formal rules concerning the weight to
be given to certain types of evidence. However, in the law of some
of the member states, notably France, official and notarial documents
(actes authentiques) are almost conclusive as to matters within the
personal knowledge of the official preparing them. As to these matters
their conclusive effect can be overcome only in a lengthy procedure
known as inscription de faux."' It is not clear whether such a rule
exists before the Court of Justice of the European Communities.
The rules of procedure prescribe that entries in the Court's register
and minutes of hearings and of witnesses' testimony are to be con-
sidered as actes authentiques (oeffentliche Urkunden),2°1 but this
statement does not necessarily amount to an incorporation by implied
reference of the French law on the subject. Even less does it follow
that documents which have a higher probative value in one of the
member states must necessarily be given the same effect by the Court.
The 1953 rules provided that a separate decision could be obtained
from the Court if the genuineness of a document was in doubt.0 -
This seemed, in a sense, to create a procedure somewhat similar to
the French inscription de faux, but the current rules contain no
be presented, but it has also been argued that the parties need not submit any
copies of documents. VAN REEPINGHEN FT ORIANNE 41.
See Barge v. Haute Autorit6 de la C. E. C. A., case 18-62, 9 Recueil 525
(1963).
"'Prakash v. Commission de la C. E. E. A., case 19-63, 11 Recueil 677 (1965).
" As noted before, the Registrar will send each party the pleadings and copies
of annexed documents. If a party submitting a pleading has not made copies
available, the Registrar must prepare and verify the required number of copies,
unless the original documents are voluminous; then the Registrar can simply
inform the parties the documents are available for their inspection at his office.
Cf. Rules of Procedure, art. 37; Instructions to Registrar, art. 3; VAN REEPINGUEN
ET ORIANNE 41, and authorities there cited. A party will not be allowed to show
a document to the Court, while refusing to make it available to the other side.
Socidt6 nouvelle des usines de Pontlieu-Aciries du Temple v. Haute Autorit6
de la C. E. C. A., case 42-59, 7 Recueil 101 (1960).
See, e.g., FRENcE Cvm CODaE, arts. 1317-1320.
o Rules of Procedure, arts. 15, § 3; 47, § 6; 53, § 1; 62, § 1.Rules of Procedure of 1953, supra note 161, art. 33, § 7.
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analogous provision. The significance of the change is open to doubt."'
Discovery of documents not in the possession of the party wishing
to rely on them is available to some extent. As noted before, under
the Coal and Steel Statute, the High Authority is under an obligation
to annex to its answer the file of documents relating to the administra-
tive decision in question, 04 and the same must be done by any de-
fendant in a personnel case. 05 In addition, the Court can order the
production of documents as one of the proof measures." 6 The pro-
cedure is not a true discovery procedure in the American sense: docu-
ments ordered produced go into the case file, whether the person
having asked for their production likes them or not. The production
of documents has been ordered in a large number of cases.207
It is unclear to what extent a party may refuse to produce docu-
ments on the ground of privilege. The Coal and Steel Treaty provides
that the High Authority must keep information as to the costs and
business relations of firms under its supervision confidential.208 Pre-
sumably, therefore, it may not divulge these even upon court order.
Furthermore, minutes of the various Community organs, especially
of the Council of Ministers, which is basically a political organ, are
frequently not intended for outsiders; their publication might prove
embarrassing to member governments and impede free and full dis-
cussion. The Court has indicated that it will accommodate Community
organs claiming that the production of certain documents would hurt
Community operations and has accepted documents from which confi-
dential passages were excised. 09
The Court has no power to physically compel the production of
'French authors generally incline towards the belief that such a rule exists
before the Court. Cf. Gori et Sizaret g 15.825; DELVAUX, LA COUR DE JUSTICE
DE LA COMMUNAUTL EUROPeENE DU CIA OIN ET DE L'AciE 11 (1956); VAN REEP-
XNGHEN ET ORIANNE 50.
" Coal and Steel Statute, art. 23.
" Personnel statute, art. 26.
"Statute, art. 21; Euratom Statute, art. 22; Coal and Steel Statute, art. 24.
Can the President of the Court be asked to order the production of documents as
part of his powers to grant provisional relief? See Prakash v. Commission de la
C. E. E. A., case 68-63, 11 Recueil 723 (1963) (no, but because a similar request
was included in the petition).
"' Usually it is the plaintiff who asks for the production of documents in the
possession of the defendant Community body. See, e.g., Gouvernement de la R~pub-
lique Italienne v. Haute Autorit6, case 2-54, 1 Recueil 73 (1954). But documents
in the hands of plaintiffs are also ordered produced at times. E.g., Barge v. Haute
Autorit de la C. E. C. A., case 18-62, 9 Recueil 525 (1963) (bills showing
plaintiff's consumption of electric power, to enable High Authority to determine
amount of scrap used by plaintiff).
" Coal and Steel Treaty, art. 47.
Raponi v. Commission de la C. E. E., case 27-63, 10 Recueil 247 (1964);
Gouvernement de ]a Rapublique Italienne v. Haute Autorit6, case 2-54, 1 Recueil 73(1954).
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documents. If a party ordered to produce documents fails to do so,
the Court can merely note this fact in its decision2 1 0-and draw from
it inferences as to the weakness of the case of the party refusing
production.
C. Questions and Requests for Information Addressed to Parties
The Court may seek information from the parties. This can be
done in a variety of ways. In its order following the end of the
written procedure, the Court may direct one or both parties to answer
questions. The Court can ask either for written answers, or request the
parties to appear in Court during a hearing and answer questions orally.
If written answers are given, copies of the answers filed with the
Registrar are, of course, given to the other side. In the case of oral
answers, both sides must be present in Court. Parties are not sworn.
While parties presumably may not ask each other questions directly,
they could ask the Court to pose additional questions. Furthermore,
the Court can request information not only at the time of its order
following the written procedure, but at any later date, and frequently
does, if it believes this will serve a useful purpose. Indeed, even after
the end of counsels' final argument the Court may reopen the case
and ask for further information from the parties. In such a case it
will ordinarily give the parties an opportunity to comment on the
evidence supplied."'
The Court usually has one of two purposes in asking questions: in
some instances it seeks additional information on the case. In other
instances it merely wants clarification of the parties' position and
possibly a narrowing of the issues. It should be noted that members
of the Court as well as the advocates-general may ask oral questions
of counsel during their argument and often do.212
D. Witnesses
Witnesses2 13 are heard in a procedure rather similar to the French
2aQStatute, art. 21; Euratom Statute, art. 22; Coal and Steel Statute, art. 24.
2Statute, arts. 21, 29; Coal and Steel Statute, arts. 24, 28; Euratom Statute,
arts. 22, 28; VAN REEPINGHEN ET ORIANNE at 43, 44. For an example of a case
involving written answers, see Officine Elettromeccaniche Ing. A. Merlini v. Haute
Autorit6 de la C. E. C. A., case 108-63, 11 Recueil 1 (1965); for oral questions see,
e.g., Gouvernement de la REpublique F6d6rale d'Allemagne v. Commission de la
C. E. E., case 24-62, 9 Recueil 129 (1963); for a case involving a reopening after
oral argument for the purpose of answering questions, see Meroni & Co. v. Haute
Autorit6 de la C. E. C. A., case 46-59, 8 Recueil 183 (1962).
2 See note 243 infra.
' Witnesses do not include parties. Parties can be examined only pursuant to
the procedure mentioned in the preceding section.
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enquite, and only pursuant to a Court order referring to specific
facts. As noted, the court is unwilling to permit testimony by wit-
nesses unless the party seeking that testimony has made at least a
preliminary showing through documentary evidence that its conten-
tion is probably correct. 14 In fact, the members of the Court seem
to feel that witnesses are a slow and somewhat unreliable means for
arriving at the truth.
If the Court approves a party's request for the examination of
witnesses, it inserts a provision to that effect in the order issued
following the written procedure. Unless the parties have already done
so in their pleadings, they must submit to the Registrar's office a list
of the witnesses they want to be heard, and of the points on which
they want these witnesses examined. The Court then renders a new
order incorporating these points. It need not cite all the witnesses
mentioned by the parties and can cite witnesses on its own motion.
Witnesses may be heard either before the full Court, or a panel, or the
reporting judge, but in practice the full Court usually hears them.
The order of the Court, which is served upon all parties and the
witnesses, serves as a subpoena. The Court may fine recalcitrant
witnesses up to $250.215
Witnesses are ordinarily heard at the beginning of a session de-
voted to oral argument. They are warned that they will have to
swear to the truthfulness of their deposition and then questioned by
the judge presiding as to their identity and as to the facts mentioned
in the Court order. Generally, the witness will first be asked to tell
in narrative form what he knows and then will be asked specific
questions. Parties and their counsel may, of course, be present but
can ask questions only through the intermediary of the judge. After
his testimony is completed, the witness is sworn. The witness' testi-
mony is taken down by tape recorder and then transcribed, but this
transcription is virtually unused. The testimony of the witness is
also taken down in summary form by the Registrar on a typewriter
and reread to the witness after its completion. The witness may make
"
1 See note 191 mipra. This is particularily true if the party is likely to be in
the possession of such documentary evidence.
Statute, art. 23; Euratom Statute, art. 24; Coal and Steel Statute, art. 28;
Rules of Procedure, arts. 47-48. If the Court is in possession of all required in-
formation as to the witnesses to be heard and the facts to be investigated at the
time it renders its first order, one order will suffice. The fine may be imposed if a
witness fails to testify or to take the oath, as well as when he fails to appear in
Court. It may be remitted for good cause shown. See generally VAN REEINrNOHEN
ET OrANNE 44, 45.
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changes. Only this record prepared by the Registrar is considered as
official. It is signed by the witness, the judge presiding, and the
Registrar. 16 There is no official fee schedule for witnesses; they are
entitled to travel expenses and loss of earnings,21' but these provisions
are not very important because, so far, most witnesses have been
Community employees who suffer no loss of earnings when they testify
before the Court.
If the Court decides that a witness has been guilty of perjury, it
may defer the matter to the national judicial authorities for the inflic-
tion of appropriate punishment. Perjury before the Court must be
considered as a crime identical to perjury before a national court in
civil matters.218
There are no specific exclusionary rules relating to privileged com-
munications 211 or any other matter. Hearsay evidence is admissible.
2 1
However, the rules provide very broadly that the parties may object
to a witness for reasons of his incapacity, indignity, or any other
cause. Such an objection must be made within two weeks from the
time the order concerning the hearing of witnesses was served on
21 Rules of Procedure, art. 47. Witnesses may either take the form of oath
prescribed in art. 47 ("I swear that I have told the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth and") or the oath prescribed by their national law. With the consent of
both parties, the Court may waive the witnesses' oath. The practice of swearing a
witness after his deposition was derived from German law. See, e.g., Riese, Die
Verfahrensordnung des Gerichtschofes des Europaeischen Gemeinschaft fur Kohle und
Stahl, 6 N.J.W., at 524; cf. Gerbrandy, De regeling van, de procedure bij lct Hof van
Jutstite van de Europease Gemneenschappen, 1 SOCIAAL-EcoNomISCHIR WETGEVING
EUROPA 97-99 (1960).
' Rules of Procedure, art. 51. These sums must be paid by the Court's pay
office after the witness has testified, but an advance may be granted. Ultimately,
the expenses must be borne by the party liable for costs, but the parties may be
requested to deposit a sum with the Court to cover probable expenses of summoning
witnesses whose testimony they have requested. Rules of Procedure, art. 47, § 3.
' On this point, there are some divergences between Statute, art. 27, and Euratom
Statute, art. 28, which are identical, on the one hand, and Coal and Steel Statute,
art. 28. The latter of prescribes that violations must be reported to the national
Minister of justice, but does not state in so many words that national courts
must treat perjury as if it had been committed before them; the Statute and
Euratom Statute contain such a clause but do not say what official must be informed.
However, Supplemental Rules of Procedure, art. 6, J. 0., May 5, 1962, provides
that the national Minister of Justice must be informed. For a discussion of
problems in this area, see Dumon et Rigaux, La Cour de Justice des Conz-
iunautis europgennes et les jitridictions des Etats vienbhres, 19 AN ALES DE
DROIT rT DE SCIENCES POLITIQUES 7, 17-19 (1959); Rasquin, Le R glenent addi-
tional de procddure de la Courde Justice des Commnunautts Europiennes, 77 jotRuAL
DES TImUNAUX 345, 347-48 (1962).
" Presumably, the Court will not punish a witness who insists that his national
law (for instance rules relating to confidential information acquired in a professional
capacity, cf. FRENCH CODE P~ NAL, art. 378) prevents him from divulging infor-
tion. Rules of Community law prohibiting the disclosure of information, such
as Coal and Steel Treaty, art. 47, are evidently binding upon witnesses and the Court.
' See Prakash v. Commission de la C. E. E. A., case 19-63, 11 Recueil 677 (1965).
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the parties.21 It is not clear to what extent that provision incorporates
the various national rules of the member states as to challenges to
witnesses likely to be prejudiced (e.g., because of relationship to the
other side) or untrustworthy (e.g., because of a criminal past) into
the law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities.222
If a witness resides in one of the member states, the Court may,
instead of summoning him, send letters rogatory to the court of his
residence asking that he be heard.2 These letters rogatory must
be executed. There is no provision for the sending of letters rogatory
to a country that is not a member of the European Communities.224
E. Experts, Viewing of the Premises
The role of experts before the Court of Justice of the European
Communities, as in Europe generally, is somewhat different from the
role of experts in trials in the United States. They are not restricted
to the answering of hypothetical questions about facts already before
the Court, but must frequently seek out the facts by whatever in-
vestigations are necessary, and then prepare a report detailing both
the facts and their own opinion on these facts. Experts have been
used quite rarely by the Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ties, not more than four or five times. Unlike the situation before
general civil courts, where experts are usually concerned with the
natural sciences, the Court has been more concerned with experts on
economic matters.2 5  Experts do not have to be nationals of the
member states; in one instance a Swiss expert on railroad rates was
appointed. 2 ' The Court of Justice of the European Communities
keeps no list of official experts. In fact, if the parties agree on an
expert, he will usually be appointed.
= Rules of Procedure, art. 50.
MIIGLIAZZA, LA CORTE Di GIusTIzriA DELL COMmUNITA EuRoPEE 181 (1961),
argues that the Court has a complete freedom to exercise its own discretion in the
matter; RiCHEMONT, COMMUNAUTt EUROPAENE DU CHABoDr r DE L'AcER, LA COUR
DE JusTicE 367 (1954), believes the Court is bound by national law. So far, cases
are lacking.
'Statute, art. 26; Euratom Statute, art. 27; Rules of Procedure, arts. 1-3 J. 0.,
May 5, 1962, p. 113, which provide that the letters must be transmitted to the
Minister of Justice of the pertinent member state. See generally Rasquin, supra
note 218, at 345-46.
' In the only case so far involving an absent witness, he had travelled to the
U. S. A. See Prakash v. Commission de la C. E. E. A., case 19-63, 11 Recueil 677
(1965).
See generally WHITE, THE USE OF EXPERTS BY INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 211-
25 (1965).
='Chambre Syndicale de la Sidgrurgie de l'Est de la France v. Haute Autorit6
de la C. E. C. A., case 24-58, 6 Recueil 573 (1960).
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If the Court wishes to appoint an expert, it so provides in its order
concerning proof. The order should specify the matters the expert
must deal with and give him a maximum time for the performance of
his duties. The order is served on the parties and the expert. The
expert then begins his investigations and prepares a report. During
this period he should keep the reporting judge informed as to his
progress. After the report is complete, it is presented to the Court.
At that time the expert must take an oath that he has performed
his duties faithfully and impartially, but the oath may be waived.
The Court may order the expert to appear in open court, where he
can be questioned on his report by the Court. The parties must be
summoned to the hearing and can request the Court to ask questions..22 7
Experts are entitled to a fee and reimbursement for their expenses.228
Presumably because experts are therefore somewhat expensive, the
Court seems even more reluctant than in the case of witnesses to
authorize their use unless a preliminary showing of good cause has
been made.22 9 The rules as to challenges to experts and the punish-
ment of experts for perjury are the same as those applicable to
witnesses.23 °
The Rules of Procedure authorize the Court to visit the premises
involved in litigation.31 So far, the Court has done so only twice,
each time to get an impression as to actual industrial processes in-
volved in litigation. 32 Parties and their counsel must be notified of
such an event and are entitled to be present.
F. Termination of the Proof Procedure
At the end of the proof procedure, the Court usually gives the
parties permission to file written memoranda concerning the proof
and indicates a time limit for their filing.233 In the memoranda the
parties will comment on the evidence and may even request additional
proof proceedings, especially if some new fact was developed. As
'In fact, the Court could appoint more than one expert, even a commission or
official agency, Statute, art. 22; Coal and Steel Statute, art. 24; Euratom Statute,
art. 23. As to the procedure for hearing experts, see Rules of Procedure, art. 49.
'Rules of Procedure, art. 51. There is no official schedule of fees, which
seem to be a matter of agreement. The rules as to advances and ultimate liability
are the same as in the case of witnesses.
'E.g., Barge v. Haute Autorit6 de la C. E. C. A., case 14-64, 11 Recueil 1 (1965).
See notes 218, 221-22 supra.
Rules of Procedure, art. 45, § 2.
See Soci~t6 des fonderies de Pont-5.-Mousson v. Haute Autorit, case 14-59.
5 Recueil 445 (1959); Socit6 nouvelle des usines de Pontlieu-Aci~res du Temple
v. Haute Autorit6 de la C. E. C. A., case 42-59, 7 Recueil 101 (1960).Rules of Procedure, art. 54.
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noted, additional proof may be ordered even after the end of oral
argument; normally, however, proof proceedings terminate with the
filing of the memoranda.
VIII. ORAL PROCEDURE AND JUDGMENT
A. The Hearing for Oral Argument
After the termination of the proof procedure, cases are put on the
calendar for the formal hearing. The preparation of the calendar is
under the control of the President.3 4 Cases should be put on the
calendar in the order in which the proof proceedings have been term-
inated; in that happens for several cases at the same time, the date
of the original filing controls. The rules provide for an automatic
priority only in a limited class of cases; however, the President may
grant a priority if this seems advisable. If both parties wish a post-
ponement of the case, they must request it from the President, who is
not bound by their agreement. If only one party desires a postpone-
ment, he must request it from the President, but the President transfers
the matter to the Court for decision.2 35 Attorneys are informed of the
hearing date at least two to three weeks beforehand by letter. If the
hearing takes place soon after the summer recess, this notice is mailed
before the beginning of the vacation. In addition, a day calendar is
posted in the Courthouse."8 The time elapsing between the end of
the proof proceedings and the hearing has varied.
The hearing is always before the full Court, except in employee
cases handled by a panel. It is also attended by the advocate-general
as well as the Registrar.37 All of these officials wear gowns and
sit on a rostrum. The courtroom is equipped with a simultaneous
translation system enabling the members of the Court, counsel and
spectators to listen to the proceedings in all four Community languages.
The Registrar prepares summary minutes for each hearing, indicating
the judges present, parties, et cetera.23 8 Hearings are public, but the
"'Statute, art. 31; Euratom Statute, art. 32; Coal and Steel Statute, art. 28.
Cf. Rules of Procedure, art. 54, providing that the President determines the date
for the beginning of the oral procedure after termination of the proof proceedings.
Rules of Procedure, art. 55. Cf. art. 85. Priorities are granted automatically
in cases in which the Court must deal with provisional remedies. See also Gori et
Sizaret 15.827.
-' Instructions to Registrar, art. 7, § 1.
See text at part I B supra.
Instructions to Registrar, art. 7, § 2, implementing Statute, art. 30; Euratom
Statute, art. 31; Coal and Steel Statute, art. 27; Rules of Procedure, art. 62.
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public may be excluded for grave reasons32 The President formally
opens the hearing.240
Under the statutes, the hearing on each case starts with the report
of the reporting judge.2 41 It summarizes the contentions of the parties
and the proceedings to date. It is customary, however, to mail copies
of the report to the parties a few days before the hearing. At the
request of the President the parties then usually waive the reading
of the report. Subsequently counsel for both sides argue and discuss
the facts and the various points of law raised during the proceedings.
They may not raise new matters, except to the extent already indi-
cated.242 Sometimes questions are directed at counsel by the President.
On occasion, the President has asked counsel to concentrate their argu-
ments on one particular point which the Court considers to be crucial.
The other members of the Court may also ask questions.243 It is cus-
tomary for the President to ask them whether they have any questions
for counsel before counsel leaves the rostrum from which he addresses
the Court.
Plaintiff's counsel always speaks first, followed by defendant's
counsel. After defendant's counsel has terminated his discussion, the
President asks plaintiff's counsel whether he wishes to rebut. The
defendant's counsel is asked whether he has anything additional to
say. Plaintiff and defendant do not always take advantage of their
opportunity to rebut. There are no time limits on the arguments.
Hence they frequently last quite long. Argument during one of the
important scrap equalization tax cases, in which there were many
parties, is said to have lasted over sixty hours.244 Now that the Court
is much busier than a few years ago, however, arguments tend to
be shorter. In employee cases a main argument for each side lasting
less than half an hour, with a few minutes devoted to rebutter would
not be unusual. Hence, several cases can be scheduled for argument
during one session of the Court. Parties' counsel are under no obliga-
Statute, art. 28; Euratom Statute, art. 29; Coal and Steel Statute, art. 26.
Cf. Rules of Procedure, art. 56, § 2: decision to exclude the public also means that
reports of hearing may not be published.
Rules of Procedure, art. 56.Statute, art. 18; Euratom Statute, art. 18; Coal and Steel Statute, art. 21.
-4- See text at part VI D szipra. In at least one case counsel waived argument. Van
Nuffel v. Commission de la C. E. E. A., case 93-63, 10 Recueil 961 (1964).
'Rules of Procedure, art. 57. The advocate-general assigned to the case has
the same rights. See also De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v.
Haute Autorit6, case 17-57, 5 Recueil 9 (1959) (letter sent to counsel asking
them to limit argument to one point).
"Riese, supra note 216, at 272. Another hearing is said to have taken about 24
hours. In such a case, the hearing is, of course, spread over several days.
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tion to submit the manuscript of their argument to the Court, but this
is done on occasion to facilitate the work of the simultaneous trans-
lation service.
After the conclusion of counsel's argument, the advocate-general
assigned to the case gives his report," 5 though frequently the case
is adjourned for a few days and the advocate-general's report is given
on the adjourned day. This enables him to take the parties arguments
into consideration. The advocate-general's report reviews the facts
of the case and the applicable law and suggests a judgment to the
Court. The discussion concerning the law frequently contains a de-
tailed excursion into the comparative law aspects of the case. While
it is in no sense binding upon the Court, it is therefore quite helpful and
to some extent makes up for the absence of appellate review. 46 The
report of the advocate-general terminates the oral procedure,2 47 unless
the Court should decide to reopen the case for additional proof meas-
ures or for additional oral argument. 4
The statements made during the oral procedure are taken down
by tape recorder and later transcribed. The transcript is put into the
case file.
B. The Conference
As soon as feasible after the hearing, the Court (or panel, in an
employee case) holds its conference on the case. It is conducted in a
rather informal manner, though there are some rules. Above all,
anything said in conference must remain confidential. 4 9 Only the
judges, not the advocate-general, participate, and only those judges
who were present for the hearing of the case. A simple majority con-
trols the outcome.Y In practice, the reporting judge prepares a draft
judgment, which is circulated and then discussed. Other judges may
also have a draft. The preparation of the final draft is again the
duty of the reporting judge, even though he may have been in the
minority. There may, of course, be corrections even in the final
draft. Since everything said in conference must remain confidential,
Treaty, art. 166; Euratom Treaty, art. 138; Coal and Steel Treaty, art.
32a; Rules of Procedure, art. 59, § 1.
"'See, e.g., BECKER, DER EINFLUSS DES FRANZOESISCHENT VERIVALTUNGSRECHTES
AUF DEN RECHTSSCHUTZ IN DEN EuRoPAmiscEN GaINscHAFnEr 139-40 (1963).
2" Rules of Procedure, art. 59, § 2, provides that the President declares the oral
procedure closed after the end of the advocate-general's submissions.
-"3 Rules of Procedure, arts. 60, 61.
' Statute, art. 32; Euratom Statute, art. 33; Coal and Steel Statute, art. 29.
"' Rules of Procedure, art. 27.
1966]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
it is never known whether a decision was reached unanimously or
by majority vote, and what the position of the individual judges was.
C. The Judgment
The rules of procedure mention two kinds of decisions of the Court
of Justice of the European Communities: judgments (arr~ts, Urteile),
and orders (ordonnances, Beschluesse). Orders are issued either by
the President of the Court when he grants or denies temporary relief,
or grants extensions of time, et cetera. They are also issued by the
Court in connection with some interlocutory or collateral matters such
as proof proceedings or costs. Orders are not accompanied by an
opinion. When the Court decides a case, however, whether on the
merits or on a procedural point, such as lack of standing to sue, it does
so by judgment. 51
A judgment is a long and rather complex document. It must give
the date of its rendition, state that it has been rendered by the Court
(or a panel, as the case may be), and give the names of the participa-
ting judges, of the advocate-general and of the Registrar, as well
as of the parties and their counsel. In addition it contains a summary
of the facts and the prayers for relief of the parties. These formal
recitals are followed by a rather detailed exposition of the contentions
of the parties and their counsel as contained in their pleadings (though
this does not seem to be required by the rules). There is also a
summary of the proceedings had and then only the opinion, in which
the Court gives the reasons for its ruling. At the end of the opinion
comes the decretal portion of the judgment, in which the Court decides
the issues and determines who must bear costs. 52 In their style,
the judgments are a compromise between the French method in which
the whole opinion consists of one sentence composed of a number of
subordinate clauses introduced by the word whereas and the German
method of narrative opinions. The whereas form has been formally
retained, but the opinions are much more discursive than in France.
The official text of the judgment is prepared by the Registrar and
signed by all the judges who participated (whether they voted for
or against it). All judgments must be read in open Court. The parties
must be summoned to this reading. At the time of the reading of
the judgment, mimeographed copies of it in all four procedural lan-
'See generally Gori et Sizaret 1 15.828; VAN RI PINGHEN Er ORIANN. at 56.
'
2 Statute, art. 33; Euratom Statute, art. 34; Coal and Steel Statute, art. 30
(requirement that judgment contain opinion); Rules of Procedure, art. 63 (formal
contents of judgment).
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guages are available outside the courtroom. The President usually
asks counsel whether they waive reading of the formal parts of the
judgment (parties' contentions, et cetera) and they invariably do. The
Registrar then reads the opinion and the President the decretal por-
tion of the judgment. A notice is made on the original that it has
been read in open Court. The notice is signed by the President and
Registrar and the original is filed. The parties receive certified cop-
ies. 2 53
No appeal against a judgment of the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities is possible,a 4 but to a limited extent the Court
may be asked to correct minor errors, or interpret its judgment.
Sometimes a reopening is possible." 5
Judgments by the Court must be executed in all member states
according to local procedures in civil cases, 2 " but problems are not
likely to arise. The full text of judgments is printed in the official
reports of the Court, as is the report of the advocate-general. In
addition, the decision is mentioned in the Official Gazette of the
Communities" 7
D. Costs
The procedure before the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities is relatively inexpensive. The Court itself demands neither
filing fees nor the payment of stamp or similar taxes. Parties must,
however, pay the fees and expenses of witnesses and experts. In
addition, the Court may impose avoidable expenses on a party, and
the Registrar is entitled to claim payment from a party for undue
expenses of copying or translation caused by a party25s In actual
'See generally Statute, art. 34; Euratom Statute, art. 35; Coal and Steel
Statute, art. 31; Rules of Procedure, art. 64.
=' Cf. Rules of Procedure, art. 65 (judgment effective from day rendered).
See Rules of Procedure, arts. 66 (correction of minor errors), 67 (addition
of omitted material), 98-100 (reopening on the ground of newly discovered evidence),
97 (reopening at request of third party which could not intervene). Lack of space
and time prevents a more detailed discussion of these procedures.
'Treaty, arts. 187, 192; Euratom Treaty, arts. 159, 164; Coal and Steel Treaty,
arts. 44, 92. Cf. DELVAUX, LA COUR DE JUSTICE DE LA COaXIIUNAUTt EUROPtENNE
DU CHAuoN Er PE L'AcmR 88 (1956) ; Daig, Die Gerichtsbarkeit in. der Europae-
ischen Wirtschaftsgeneihtschaft und Europaeischen Atomngemeinschaft, 83 ARCHiv
FuRm OEFFENTLiCHrES RECHT 163 (1958).
Rules of Procedure, art. 68; Instructions to Registrar, arts. 24, 25.
' Rules of Procedure, arts. 72, 73. Apparently, the drafters of the rules as to
costs felt that a fee system would create substantial administrative costs, and
furthermore the activity of the Court in clarifying Community law was in the
common interest. Suggestions made by advocate-general Roemer seem mainly to
have been followed. See Roemer, Die Kostenordnung des Gerichshofes futer Kohl und
Stahl, 8 N. J. W. at 617 (1955).
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practice, a charge for such work is not usually made. Fees are,
however, payable if parties to a suit or third parties request certified
copies of documents on file.259
The judgment of the Court must contain a decision on costs. If its
pleadings contain a prayer to that effect, the prevailing party is
granted costs 2 60 A party may include the following expenses in its
costs: fees and expenses of witnesses and experts, fees paid to the
Registrar (if any); its own travel and other expenses incurred in
connection with the suit, and the fee of its attorney.26' A reasonable
fee for the agent appointed in Luxemburg to receive service of process
may also be included, but a honorarium for more than one attorney
will not, generally, be allowed. 262
If there are several parties on the losing side, the Court allocates
costs among them. If each side prevails in part, the Court may decide
that each side bears its own costs or divides them in some other
manner. The same may be done if there are "extraordinary circum-
stances.1268 The Court has rather freely used this authorization con-
tained in the rules to make the prevailing side pay part of the costs
if required by equitable considerations. 64 In addition, the prevailing
party must bear costs it caused maliciously or without adequate
reason.265  A party withdrawing from a case must ordinarily pay
costs. If the Court declares a case moot, it allocates costs as it sees
fit.266 In suits brought by employees against Community institutions,
=' E.g., Rules of Procedure, arts. 15 § 5; 53; 62.
'Statute, art. 35; Euratom Statute, art. 36; Coal and Steel Statute, art. 32;
Rules of Procedure, art. 69, § 1.
Rules of Procedure, art. 73.
-2Mandet v. Commission de la C. E. E., case 20-63, 10 Recueil 1209 (1964).
Rules of Procedure, art. 69, §§ 2-3.
'E.g., Forges de Clabecq S. A. v. Haute Autorit6 de la C. E. C. A, case 14-63,
9 Recueil 719 (1963) (Court held that plaintiff, who lost in action for review of
scrap equalization assessment had been induced into bringing suit by the defective
draftsmanship of the regulation on which the assessment was based, hence each
side should bear its own expenses); Weighart v. Commission de la C. E. E. A.,
case 11-64, 11 Recueil 365 (1965) (decision not to give plaintiff a permanent position,
which Court held was justified, was, nevertheless based in part on stated grounds which
were incorrect; therefore held that defendant must pay half of plaintiff's costs, since
defendant probably responsible for plaintiff's decision to sue).
' Rules of Procedure, art. 69, § 4. That section, too, has been interpreted quite
liberally. See Comptoirs de Vente du Charbon de la Ruhr "Geitling," "Mausegatt"
et "President" v. Haute Autorit6 de la C. E. C. A., case 16-59, 6 Recueil 45
(1960) (court rejected petition for review of letter allegedly amounting to formal
decision because it was not a real decision, but held defendant liable for one
third of costs on ground that letter, because of its peremptory language, could easily
have been misinterpreted for binding decision).
-' Rules of Procedure, art. 69, §§ 4, 5. Cf. Soci6t "Rhenania Schiffahrtsund
Speditionsgesellschaft mbh" v. Commission de la Communaut6 6conomique europ6enne,
case 103-63, 10 Recueil 839 (1964).
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the institution always bears its own costs; otherwise the rules just
mentioned prevail. 67
The Court's final judgment merely states what party must bear
costs, without indicating any amount. If, as occasionally happens,
the parties cannot agree on that amount, for instance because the
party liable argues that the fee of his opponent's attorney is excessive,
the matter may be brought before the panel to which the case was
assigned, which decides the issue.""5
A party unable to bear the expected expenses of a suit before the
Court of Justice of the European Communities may request legal aid
from the Court. This is frequently done as part of the original peti-
tion; it may also be done before that petition is filed. In the latter
case a separate written request must be submitted to the Court. In
any case, a document issued by the applicant's national (or, perhaps,
domiciliary) authorities must be presented, which shows that he is
unable to bear the costs. If the application is made by separate re-
quest, that request must include a brief summary of plaintiff's case.
No attorney is needed. The petition is assigned by the President to
a reporting judge. The panel of which the reporting judge is a member
decides it after having given the other side a chance to make written
comments. Legal aid may not be granted if the applicant's case seems
hopeless. In determining whether the applicant has insufficient funds
to prosecute his suit, the panel is obviously not bound by the certificate
issued by the applicant's national authorities. It would seem that the
Court may make an independent investigation into the applicant's
resources.
2 60
A grant of legal aid means in substance that the Court's pay office
will make an advance up to a stated amount for the applicant's ex-
pected costs of litigation, and, generally also for his attorney's honor-
arium. In addition, the Court will appoint an attorney. If the appli-
cant suggests one, the latter will generally be appointed. Otherwise,
it will request suggestions from the applicant's national authorities,
and appoint one of the attorneys so suggested. The appointed attorney
is entitled to a reasonable fee.
If the applicant's opponent loses the case and must pay costs, he is
obligated to repay the sum advanced to the applicant directly to the
Court, instead of paying costs to the applicant. If the person having
- Rules of Procedure, art. 70.
-
3 Rules of Procedure, art. 74.
" Rules of Procedure, art. 76.
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been granted legal aid loses and must pay costs, he is theoretically
under an obligation to return what he has received from the Court,
since this is considered as a mere advance. 270 In practice, the situation
arises rarely and the Registrar probably will not make very strong
efforts to recover such amounts.
IX. CONCLUSION
Lack of space prevents a discussion of a number of special and
collateral procedures, such as intervention, the procedures for the
reopening of judgments, or the procedure used when cases are trans-
ferred from national courts for a preliminary ruling. But what has
been said so far has perhaps been enough to give at least a general
impression of the procedural style of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities. It should be noted that, in spite of some
criticisms on minor points, there seems to be no real dissatisfaction
with its procedures. It has evidently solved the problem of accommo-
dating various national views rather successfully. The general similar-
ity of the procedural systems in the member states has been of as-
sistance here. 71 Some very grave problems would undoubtedly arise
should England ever join the Six.
It may, however, not be amiss to end this discussion with a non-
procedural note. The court has sometimes been accused of lacking
boldness in furthering European integration by legal means. This
accusation may not be justified, but it is true that the Court has
not pursued a policy of urestrained judicial activism. Its President,
Mr. Ch. L. Hammes, has said: 12
But when existential conflicts are involved, the authority of the judge
cannot prevail, and in such a case judicial authority is diminished if not
debased because it played a role which put it in the limelight. Giving the
courts the role of an arbitrator in political matters cannot depoliticize a
problem, merely politicize the courts. A wise and restrictive jurispru-
dence of a court watchful for its prestige will be able to avoid these
dangers....
In view of the political situation of the Six today, this may be the
only feasible attitude.
" Rules of Procedure, art. 76, § 5. Cf. Worms v. Haute Autorit6 de la C. E. C. A.,
case 18-60, 8 Recueil 377 (1962).
m It is of some interest that recent changes in French civil procedure bring that
procedure closer to the procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities. See Dcret No. 65-872 of Oct. 13, 1965, Journal Officiel de la R6publique
Francaise, Oct. 14, 1965, p. 9076, [1965] BuLLmrnr LFGISLATII DAU oz 600.
' Hammes, La Cour de Justice des Communaut~s Europennes, mimeographed
text of lecture delivered in Luxemburg, 1959, p. 26.
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APPENDIX I
CASES HANDLED1 BY COURT OF JUSTICE OF EUROPEAN CO14NITIES'
AND COURT OF JUSTICE OF EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL CO .lUNIlTY.
New Cases
Year Introduced Cases Decided Cases Settled Cases Pending
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
(Jan.-
July)
19661
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